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Abstract
As Mobile Ad hoc NETworks (MANETs) grow more popular and are deployed as solutions in various
applications such as road safety in Vehicular Ad hoc NETworks (VANETs), wildlife tracking in Wireless
Sensor Networks (WSNs) and Device-to-Device (D2D) communications in 5G, the need for efficient routing
that is robust against malfunctioning or malicious network nodes is increasing. A fuzzy logic enhanced
Ant Colony Optimization (ACO)-based routing algorithm, which addresses these issues, is proposed in this
thesis. The Security Aware Fuzzy Enhanced Ant Colony Optimization (SAFEACO) routing protocol makes
use of a distributed fuzzy logic module to identify misbehaving nodes and exclude them from the routing
process. The SAFEACO routing protocol is implemented in the NS-3 simulator and various experiments
have been performed in both MANET and VANET scenarios. The performance of SAFEACO is compared
with other modern and widely known approaches. Simulation results show that SAFEACO has superior
performance in all relevant metrics, such as packet delivery ratio (PDR) and end-to-end delay. Due to its
ability to identify misbehaving nodes, SAFEACO also provides a higher level of robustness against black
hole, Sybil and flooding attacks.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
With the advancing development of technology, laptops, smartphones, tablets and other intelligent
mobile devices are commonly seen in daily life. In the survey [1], the results show that smartphones
are increasingly common around the world. For example, the percentage of adults in United States
who own a smartphone has increased from 56 % to 77 % in the period from 2013 to 2018 and 94 %
of adults in South Korea have at least one smartphone which makes South Korea be ranked first
place. Sweden has the highest smartphone ownership rate, 80 %, among the European countries.
With a 72 % ownership rate, Germany, United Kingdom and Chile are placed joint tenth. In
addition, China is at the 15th place which has a 68 % of smartphone penetration. The average
smartphone ownership rate across the 39 countries surveyed is 59 %. Smart devices are intelligent
and can provide many different types of services to people which make the life more comfortable,
convenient and enjoyable. Traditionally, these mobile devices can connect to infrastructure-based
networks, such as cellular networks, wired networks and WiFi hot spots. At the same time, these
devices can also form what is called Mobile Ad hoc NETwork (MANET) [2], which does not require
infrastructure. Generally speaking, MANETs consist of wireless mobile devices which can join
and leave the network freely. Due to the lack of infrastructure, a MANET can be deployed with
obviously lower costs in comparison to those required by deploying a wired network. For example,
mobile devices can connect with each other directly via Bluetooth or WiFi and there is no additional
requirements for cables, routers or other types of infrastructure-based equipments. There are many
different types of MANETs. For example, the Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) [3] is a type of
MANETs which has been applied in many fields. WSNs can monitor environmental measurements,
such as temperature, humidity, air pollution and so on. Another example is the Vehicular Ad hoc
NETwork (VANET) [4]. In a VANET, vehicles communicate directly with each other or with a Road
Side Unit (RSU) to exchange road information to support road safety. In recent years, flying ad hoc
networks have been developed. This type of MANETs consists of a number of unmanned aerial
vehicle and can be applied for disaster rescue operations. In order to provide an alternate means
for information dispersal when all other infrastructure is unavailable, the Smart Phone Ad hoc
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Network (SPAN) project is initiated by the MITRE [5]. This project utilizes MANET technology to
provide communication between individuals when the communication via all other infrastructure
is unavailable. A group of smartphones can leverage primarily Bluetooth and WiFi technology
to create SPANs without relying on network infrastructure such as cellular carrier networks and
wireless access points. Different from the cellular spectrum, Bluetooth and WiFi technology which
is used to connect smartphones requires no special license according to the regulations of most
jurisdictions. Furthermore, smartphones can freely join and leave these networks, thus the set up
and tear down of SPANs are dynamic and flexible. Due to the high smartphone ownership rate,
a SPAN can be conveniently applied in many daily life scenarios. SPANs are good solutions of
supporting communication in developing nations where network infrastructure does not exist. For
example, the deployment of infrastructure-based networks in a mountain area normally is difficult
and cost intensive, but SPANs can enable communications with a lower cost in this area. SPANs
are also very useful in natural disasters or terrorist incidents. For example, after a earthquake
the existing infrastructure-based networks, for example, cellular networks, may be destroyed
and overloaded. SPANs can keep mobile devices connected and aid people during disaster relief
operations. Moreover, in temporary large-scale events, for example, music festivals in which huge
scale is needed but only for a short period of time, the price-performance ratio of applying SPANs
in this case is better than that of using the infrastructure-based networks. SPANs can also be used
by protesters as a communication tool, using mobile applications, such as FireChat [6], which allow
users to exchange messages and pictures via MANETs.
1.1 Research Question
MANET applications bring many benefits and make life more comfortable and convenient. How-
ever, to gain all these benefits efficient and secure communication between nodes in MANETs is
required. Therefore, routing protocols which fulfill the requirements of MANET applications are
desired. Since the 1990s, many state-of-the-art routing protocols have been proposed for MANETs,
such as Destination-Sequenced Distance-Vector (DSDV) [7], Ad hoc On-Demand Distance Vector
routing (AODV) [8] and Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) [9]. However, these routing protocols
proposed long time ago focus on solving basic routing requirements and can hardly fulfill the
various new requirements of MANET routing nowadays. Besides the basic routing requirements,
new routing protocols designed for MANETs are supposed to work in a self-organizing manner
and provide low packet delay, high packet delivery rate and effective adaptation to network
topology changes with low control overhead.
Since biologists and nature scientists have found that activities in many biological systems such
as ant colonies and bee colonies are based on simple rules and don’t rely on any centralized
control structure [10], many meta-heuristics inspired by biological systems have been introduced
by different scientists in the past two decades. G. Beni and J. Wang introduced the expression of
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Figure 1.1: Swarm intelligence benefits.
Swarm Intelligence (SI) in their research of cellular robotic systems in 1993 [11]. The concept of SI
is employed in work on Artificial Intelligence (AI). SI is a computational intelligence technique
which is based on the collective behavior of decentralized, self-organized systems [12]. A typical
SI system is made up of a group of simple agents which interact locally with each other and
with the environment surrounding them [13]. Agents in an SI system follow simple rules and
act without the control of any centralized entities. However, the social interactions between
such agents often lead to smart global behavior. A. K. Kordon pointed out in [12] the main
advantages of applying SI which are shown in figure 1.1. By fully taking advantage of the swarm,
SI systems are able to provide optimized solutions, which ensure high robustness, flexibility
and low cost, for large-scale sophisticated problems without a centralized control entity [12].
Stochastic Diffusion Search (SDS) [14], Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO) [15] and Ant Colony
Optimization (ACO) [16] are some well-known meta-heuristics in field of SI.
The ACO algorithm is inspired by biology and follows the approach that ants use in finding
efficient paths, by tracking pheromones deposited along the way. It applies just as well in networks
as it does in nature and presents a common framework for approximating solutions to NP-hard
optimization problems [17]. Due to the dynamic nature of ACO’s connectivity, ACO is able
to continuously adapt to network changes in real time [18]. Moreover, the artificial ants can
find multiple solutions simultaneously for the considered problem [17]. Therefore, ACO based
algorithms are able to efficiently find optimal routes, which has lead to them been applied in the
field of routing for network communication.
As the value of MANET applications increases the motivation of attackers to manipulate or disrupt
them also increases. In critical MANET applications, it is always likely to have adversaries, who
aim to disrupt the network or discover private information on the network. For example, malicious
vehicles in VANET scenarios can broadcast fake road safety messages which could possibly cause
traffic jams or even accidents. In such environments, human life can be endangered if the network
is not operating correctly due to attacks. Moreover, some of the nodes in a MANET might act
selfish in the routing process to save their battery power or data storage. Therefore, the design
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of routing protocols plays an important role in protecting security in MANETs. The goal of this
thesis is to design an efficient routing protocol in MANETs that can provide not only high Packet
Delivery Ratio (PDR), low end-to-end delay and low overhead, but also can be robust against
malfunctioning devices and malicious network participants.
1.2 Thesis Contributions
The main contributions of this thesis can be summarized as follows:
• Review of the existing ACO based routing protocols in MANETs from 1998 up to now, the
classification of reviewed ACO based routing protocols, the comparative analysis in terms of
protocol design and simulation related parameters for all reviewed protocols, the summary
of the development of ACO based routing protocols and the discussion of the open issues
and the possible future research directions in this field.
• Modeling and implementation of Security Aware Fuzzy Enhanced Ant Colony Optimization
routing protocol (SAFEACO) which aims to find optimal routes while also detecting and
isolating suspicious nodes in MANETs.
• Further development and implementation of SAFEACO in VANET scenarios.
• Implementation of three selected types of network layer attacks for the evaluation.
• Experimental analysis and evaluation of the proposed SAFEACO routing protocol in both
MANET and VANET scenarios with respect to several performance metrics.
1.3 Impact
During the course of this work, a survey paper which reviews the existing ACO-based routing
protocols in MANETs has been published in the following peer reviewed journal:
• H. Zhang, X. Wang, P. Memarmoshrefi, and D. Hogrefe, “A survey of ant colony optimization
based routing protocols for mobile ad hoc networks,” IEEE Access, vol. 5, pp. 24 139–24 161,
2017. [Online]. Available: http://doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2017.2762472
In addition, the main articles which include the primary idea and the intermediate results have
been published in the following peer reviewed conference proceedings:
• H. Zhang, A. Bochem, X. Sun, and D. Hogrefe, “A Security Aware Fuzzy Enhanced Ant
Colony Optimization Routing in Mobile Ad hoc Networks,” in Wireless and Mobile Comput-
ing, Networking and Communications (WiMob). IEEE, 2018.
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• H. Zhang, A. Bochem, X. Sun, and D. Hogrefe, “A security aware fuzzy enhanced reliable ant
colony optimization routing in vehicular ad hoc networks,” in 2018 IEEE Intelligent Vehicles
Symposium (IV). IEEE, 2018, pp. 1071–1078. [Online]. Available: http://doi.org/10.
1109/IVS.2018.8500485
• H. Zhang, A. Bochem, X. Sun, and D. Hogrefe, “Employing Fuzzy Logic to Provide Security
Awareness in ACO Routing for MANETs,” in Wireless Communications and Networking
Conference (WCNC). IEEE, 2018.
1.4 Thesis Scope
Chapter 1 gives an introduction to the studied problem and emphasizes the main contributions of
the thesis. The thesis scope gives an overview of the content in the thesis.
Chapter 2 introduces the theoretical foundations of this thesis as shown in figure 1.2. Section 2.1
presents an overview of the existing routing protocols in both MANETs and VANETs. Section 2.2.2
first presents the basis of the Ant Colony Optimization (ACO) algorithm and ACO-based routing
algorithm in MANETs. Then, a review of the existing ACO-based routing protocols in MANETs is
presented based on five main categories in section 2.2.3. A comparative analysis of the reviewed
protocols in each category is presented in the form of different tables which display design related
parameters in section 2.2.4. Another comparative analysis that focuses on simulation parameters
and a general discussion of the open issues and possible future research directions in the field
of ACO-based routing protocols are given in section 2.2.5. After the review of the ACO-based
routing protocols in MANETs, a brief introduction of attacks in MANETs is presented in section 2.3.
Finally, the three network layer attack models which are applied for evaluating the performance of
SAFEACO in chapter 5 are introduced in section 2.4.
Figure 1.2: Theoretical foundations.
Chapter 3 first introduces the routing mechanism of SAFEACO in detail. Reactive route setup,
proactive route maintenance, data transmission and the handling of link failures in SAFEACO
are explained in detail in section 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4. Then the fuzzy based malicious behavior
detection system which includes the input and output values, the fuzzy rules and the fuzzy
inference system are presented separately for MANET and VANET scenarios in section 3.5.2 and
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3.5.3.
Chapter 4 introduces the network simulator and tools which are used for the experiments. All the
implementation related parameters are given in detail based on the network types in section 4.2
and 4.3.
Figure 1.3: Simulation experiments design.
Chapter 5 presents the experimental analysis and evaluation of the proposed SAFEACO scheme
regarding several performance metrics. The simulation experiments are designed separately for
two scopes: MANET and VANET scenarios. For MANET scenarios, the performance of SAFEACO
is investigated under black hole and Sybil attacks. For the latter, black hole and flooding attacks are
both applied during the investigation. Figure 1.3 gives an overview of the simulation experiments
in this thesis. More details of the experimental series can be found in table 5.1 and 5.7 in chapter 5.
Section 5.2 presents the performance results based on the black hole and Sybil attacks in different
MANET scenarios. Section 5.3 shows the performance results based on the black hole and flooding
attacks in different VANET scenarios. The discussion sections 5.2.3 and 5.3.5 in this chapter also
summarize the overall performance of SAFEACO in both MANET and VANET experiments.
Finally, Chapter 6 concludes the work and presents a brief discussion of the possible future
directions for the research.
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Chapter 2
Theoretical Foundations
The main objective of this chapter is to introduce the theoretical foundations of this thesis. First,
the routing algorithms in wireless ad hoc network are introduced. Then, the ACO algorithm and a
review of the existing ACO-based routing protocols for MANETs are presented. The fuzzy logic
algorithm and the network security challenges are explained afterwards. At the end, the three
network layer attack models, which are applied in the experiments, are presented.
2.1 Routing in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks
With the emergence of portable smart devices and the development of technology in wireless
communications, wireless applications have expanded very fast in the past few decades. The
flexibility of wireless ad hoc networks, and the absence of network infrastructure makes this kind
of networks easier and cheaper to put into place than traditional wired networks, which need a
suitable system of cables. These properties enable creating considerable commercial applications.
Wireless applications enable users to have rapid access to information independent of time or place,
and therefore such kind of wireless applications is getting more and more popular. The demands
of self-organization, independence, adaptability, and cost reduction in wireless applications have
encouraged researchers to find solutions for improving many functions of wireless networks.
MANET which effectively meed these demands are a proper solution.
2.1.1 MANETs
MANET [2] is an autonomous system of mobile nodes and associated hosts connected by wireless
links, without the need for the infrastructure support or a centralized administration. Nodes
in such network act also as routers. Furthermore, these nodes are free to move and organize
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themselves arbitrarily. Therefore, the prediction of the high dynamic network topology changes is
very difficult.
In comparison with the wired networks, MANETs are more flexible and robust and they are able
to deal with node mobility. Since MANETs do not require any infrastructure support or a central
administration, the deployment of MANETs is very simple and a new MANET becomes opera-
tional the moment all wireless terminals are presented in the given space. In certain environments
where wired networks are not available, such as natural disasters, MANETs are the only available
means of communication and access to information. Moreover, MANETs also play an important
role in applications for civil recreations, conferences, and so on. MANETs also can be considered as
a wireless Internet network. Therefore, users of MANETs can move geographically while keeping
the connection with the rest of the world.
The principal characteristics of MANETs are summarized as below [2]:
Lack of infrastructure:
A key difference between MANETs and the other types of mobile networks is that there is no
preexisting infrastructure or any form of centralized administration in MANETs. The establishment
and maintenance of the network connectivity are handled by the mobile nodes in a self-organized
manner.
Dynamic topology:
As introduced before, nodes in MANETs can move randomly and they can also freely join or leave
the network at any time. As consequence, the changes of the network topology are rapid and
unpredictable.
Limited bandwidth and variable capacity of links:
Since the wireless transmission channel is shared, bandwidth in MANETs is restricted in compar-
ison with the one offered by the wired networks. Congestion is a major problem caused by the
limited bandwidth.
Energy constraints:
Mobile nodes are usually equipped by autonomous energy sources, such as batteries. Since the
energy in batteries is limited, the energy consumption is important as it affects the life expectancy
of the network.
Limited security:
In the classic wired networks, the central administration can take care of the security issues for
the whole network. However, due to the absence of infrastructure, there is no such administrative
node in MANETs. Therefore, it’s more difficult to ensure the security in MANETs than in classic
wired networks.
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2.1.2 Routing in MANETs
Generally speaking, routing is the process of selecting a path for transmitting information to the
targeted destination in a network. In wired networks, routers are responsible for determining
the path for packet transmission. However, there is no such type of nodes in MANETs. Wireless
communication in MANETs is carried out directly between neighboring nodes or via intermediary
nodes. Packets are delivered hop by hop. Every node in MANETs acts as a router, and retransmits
packets to the next hop when it becomes the intermediate node in the paths of the other nodes.
Routing in MANETs is therefore the process of searching the best path from source to destination.
The main challenge for routing protocols in MANETs is to deal with the nodes’ mobility while
considering the limited network resources, such as bandwidth and energy [19]. Due to the absence
of infrastructure, every node must take part in the route discovery and maintenance processes to
the other nodes. Another essential issue for the routing protocols is to reduce the routing overhead
despite the increasing number of nodes and their mobility [19]. There are many different ways
to classify the routing protocols in MANETs. By considering the method used to discover and
maintain routes, these protocols can be classified as proactive, reactive and hybrid [19].
Proactive routing
Every node in the proactive routing protocols such as the DSDV protocol [20] and Optimized Link
State Routing protocol (OLSR) [21], regularly maintains the up-to-date routing information in its
routing tables, no matter whether it has any data packets to send. The end-to-end packet delay in
this type of routing protocols is usually low, since the data packets at the source nodes can be sent
out at once without waiting for the route discovery process. However, in order to maintain the
up-to-date global view of the network, any change in the network topology triggers updates in
the routing tables. Therefore, the signalization which affects the bandwidth is a challenge in such
routing protocols. Furthermore, in large networks or in networks which have frequent and rapid
topological development, the routing overhead in this type of routing protocols is relatively high.
Reactive routing
Different from the proactive routing protocols, a node in the reactive routing protocols such as
AODV [8] and DSR [9] starts the route discovery process only when it has data packets to send
and there is no valid route in the routing table. The advantage of these protocols is that the routing
overhead caused by the regular updates in the routing tables is reduced. However, the end-to-end
packet delay in this type of routing protocols is relative high, as there is no routing information
when the data packets arrive at the source nodes.
Hybrid routing
Hybrid routing protocols attempt to combine the advantages of the proactive and reactive protocols.
An example in this category is Zone Routing Protocol (ZRP) [22]. In ZRP, the routing mechanism
applied by the nodes depends on whether the destination node is located inside the predefined
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zone. Before the data transmission, source nodes decide the size of the zone in which the proactive
routing mechanism is applied, for example within three hops. In this case, source node maintains
all existing routes information in its routing table for all nodes within its three hop zone and the
reactive routing mechanism is triggered when the destination node is outside this zone.
Over the past two decades, researchers have proposed various routing approaches. In the early
development phase of MANETs, these protocols were considered to be state of the art protocols
and were sufficient to satisfy the demands of MANET applications. However, there are also some
shortcomings in the existing routing protocols in MANETs as pointed out in [19]: First, these
routing protocols have not covered all routing problems, for example reducing delay, data drop
ratio, and the network load. Secondly, many of them use only the best route for data delivery
and there is no alternative route when the primary route has congestions. Furthermore, they do
not concern with link reliability, such as the available bandwidth, end-to-end delay and energy
consumption. Finally, most of them do not consider the efficiency of the route, as they aim to find
any route, not the optimal route, from the source node to the destination node.
In order to satisfy the increasingly higher levels of requirements by the advanced MANETs
applications, routing protocols in MANETs are suggested to provide high efficiency in adapting to
the frequent topology changes in MANETs and to consider the Quality of Service (QoS) merits
such as end-to-end delay and energy consumption in the route discovery process [19]. Instead of
searching the shortest route, they should find the optimal routes which consider multiple routing
merits, such as bandwidth and packet losses. Furthermore, they should also be able to provide
an alternative route in case the primary one fails. The overhead made by the control packets
is suggested to be kept as low as possible. Finally, the security threatens in the routing process
should also be considered. Researchers are encouraged to design new routing protocols, which
could provide higher packet delivery ratio, lower end-to-end delay and less overhead, while also
providing high levels of security.
The ACO meta-heuristic is inspired by the foraging behavior of ants in nature. It presents a
common framework for approximating solutions to NP-hard optimization problems [17]. Due to
the dynamic nature of ACO’s connectivity, ACO is able to continuously adapt to network changes
in real time [18]. Moreover, the artificial ants can find multiple solutions simultaneously for the
considered problem [17]. Therefore, ACO-based algorithms are able to efficiently find optimal
routes, which has lead to applying them in the field of routing for network communication. A
review of the existing ACO-based routing protocols in MANETs is given in section 2.2.3. Although
ACO-based routing mechanism can efficiently find the optimal routes in dynamic networks, it can
not inherently defend against the network layer attacks. Researchers have also proposed several
protocols which consider the security related parameters in the route discovery process. These
security aware ACO-based routing protocols are introduced in section 2.2.3.
Besides these security aware ACO-based routing protocols, there are also other approaches which
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are based on state-of-the-art routing protocols. Enhanced Adaptive ACKnowledgment (EAACK)
which was proposed by Shakshuki et al. [23] in 2013 is one of the widely cited approaches
in the recent years. It is based on the DSR [9] protocol and employs an enhanced adaptive
acknowledgment scheme to detect malicious nodes. EAACK shows better performance than
DSR, AACK [24] and TWOACK [25] with respect to both overhead and PDR. However, the
authors do not evaluate the end to end delay of EAACK. Since EAACK is based on DSR, its
reactive routing mechanism should lead to a higher amount of delay than it would be present
in a hybrid scheme. EAACK’s misbehavior detection system consists of three phases applied in
sequence: ACKnowledgment (ACK), Secure ACKnowledgment (S-ACK) and Misbehavior Report
Authentication (MRA). ACK is an end-to-end acknowledgment scheme. If ACK fails, S-ACK and
MRA are trigged. S-ACK is used to detect misbehaving nodes and generate misbehavior reports.
MRA mode is applied to authenticate the misbehavior reports. This hierarchical detection system
leads to additional delay. Moreover, the application of MRA requires that the source node has at
least one alternative route to the destination node. However, in a highly dynamic network, this is
not guaranteed. If there exists no alternative route, the source node has to find a new route, which
leads to further delay.
Tan et. al proposed the Fuzzy Petri net based Trust model embedded Optimized Link State
Routing (FPNT-OLSR) protocol which is a trust based routing mechanism for secure routing in
MANETs in 2015 [26]. In FPNT-OLSR four trust factors are defined for evaluating the nodes
behavior in both route discovery and data delivery process. A Multi-Point Relay (MPR) node
monitors its neighborhood and evaluates the trust value of a target node by using the proposed
trust reasoning model based on the collected trust factors. Later the trust value is propagated as
recommendation in the network. After receiving multiple recommendations, the node should
aggregate all these recommended trust values and its own direct trust values into the overall
trust values. Since FPNT-OLSR is a proactive routing protocol, a node updates its trust based
routing table regularly. The routes in the routing table are sorted by the overall trust values of
the routes. Although FPNT-OLSR can provide secure routes in MANETs, there are still some
shortcomings. First, without the recommended trust values from the MPR nodes, a normal node
can not update its trust based routing table. In case that a node has selected only one MPR
node which is malicious, this node is hard to find any secure route to any other nodes in the
network. In case that a node has selected more than one MPR node, the node has to wait for all
the recommendations from the chosen MPR nodes and aggregate them to the overall trust values.
This causes a delay of updating the routing table. Furthermore, the recommendation based system
is vulnerable to the Sybil attack which can create multiple identities and flood the a huge amount
of fake recommendations. Secondly, the energy consumption and the congestion at the MPR nodes
need to be considered, since MPR nodes are responsible not only for searching routes and sending
the topology control packets, but also for evaluating and propagating trust values. If there is no
counter measurement, the MPR nodes should run out of power much earlier than the normal
nodes. Selecting new MPR nodes leads to more overhead and end-to-end delay. Thirdly, as in
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all other proactive routing protocols, the regularly updates of the trust values and the routing
tables lead to the communication overhead. Finally, despite the trust reasoning model and the
trust propagation process which are applied to detect the malicious nodes, FPNT-OLSR does not
change the basic routing structure of OLSR. The experiments results with apparent fluctuations in
scenarios without malicious nodes are not very convincing. Although OLSR is an efficient routing
protocol in MANETs [26], the results of the different series of experiments made by Ducatelle
show that AntHocNet is more efficient than OLSR. Therefore, the AntHocNet routing structure is
applied in the proposed SAFEACO. More details are presented in chapter 3.
Since VANETs are a special type of MANETs, some of the MANET routing approaches can be
applicable to VANET scenarios, such as the proposed SAFEACO in this thesis. The next section
will give a short overview of the routing in VANETs.
2.1.3 Routing in VANETs
Besides routing protocols which are designed for MANETs, researchers have also proposed many
routing protocols for VANETs due to the increasing number of new applications in VANETs.
VANETs [4] consist of collections of mobile vehicles and are becoming a new emerging branch
of wireless technology which are derived from MANETs [27]. Although VANETs have several
similarities to MANETs, they are distinguished from other kinds of MANETs by their vehicle
movement properties (e.g. high speed), hybrid network architectures and practical application
scenarios. There are various applications for VANETs, the main one being Intelligent Transporta-
tion Systems (ITS) [28]. ITS is not a single application, but rather includes a variety of applications,
such as co-operative traffic monitoring, the control of traffic flows, prevention of collisions, nearby
information services, providing Internet connectivity to vehicles and so on [28]. Due to the high
mobility and unreliable channel conditions, VANETs have many unique characteristics, which
pose many challenging research issues when implementing its functionalities, such as data dis-
semination and data sharing [28]. Security is another important issue, as unreliability might lead
to dangerous situations in road traffic. As the applications in VANETs become increasingly more
widespread, attackers are also more motivated to manipulate or disrupt the communications in
VANET applications. Therefore, the design of efficient and secure routing protocols for VANETs is
very important. However, due to the dynamic nature of the VANETs, discovery and maintenance
of routes is a very challenging task. To solve this issue, a variety of different routing protocols
have been proposed. They generally fit into five categories: ad hoc, position-based, cluster-based,
broadcast, and geocast routing [28].
Ad hoc routing
Ad hoc routing protocols for VANETs are mainly the ones which are originally designed for
MANETs, such as the AODV [8] and DSR [9]. VANETs have many similarities to other types
of MANETS, such as not relying on fixed infrastructure, having low bandwidth, short radio
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transmission range and so on. However, vehicles in VANETs move much faster than the normal
mobile nodes in MANETs, which can lead to poor performance of MANET routing algorithms in
VANETs.
Position-based routing
In position-based routing protocols, nodes use location information to help facilitate communica-
tions. For examples, in greedy routing nodes always forward the packets to the node that has the
shortest geographical distance to the destination. Greedy Perimeter Stateless Routing (GPSR) [29]
is one of the representative position-based protocols in literature. In GPSR there is no need to
establish a global route from source nodes directly to destination nodes, which can reduce the
processing costs of system. In city scenarios however, GPSR can suffer from several problems, due
to the presence of obstacles and mobility leading to routing loops [28].
Cluster-based routing
Cluster-based routing attempts to provide scalability by creating a virtual hierarchical network
infrastructure through the clustering of nodes. Vehicles are divided into clusters with cluster
heads that coordinate intra- and inter-cluster communications. While vehicles inside a cluster
communicate with each other directly, the communications between clusters are performed via
the cluster-heads or the cluster gateways. Santos et al. [30] have proposed a Cluster-Based Loca-
tion Routing algorithm (CBLR) for VANETs. It assumes that all nodes can gather their position
information by Global Position System (GPS) to build the clusters. Simulation results show that
CBLR can achieve good scalability for large networks. However, forming and maintaining clusters
causes extra overhead. Moreover, cluster-based routing protocols also rely on the geographical
information of vehicles to create stable clusters, which may not always be reliable or available.
Broadcast routing
Broadcast routing protocols, such as Urban Multi-Hop Broadcast protocol (UMB) [31], transmit
data to all available nodes within communication range over the entire network. This kind of
routing performs relatively well for VANETs with a limited small number of vehicles and is easy
to implement. However, when the number of vehicles in the network increases, the bandwidth
requirements increase exponentially [28]. Moreover, since each node receives and re-broadcasts
every message almost at the same time, it leads to packet collisions and network congestion, which
may cause a high amount of additional overhead.
Geocast routing
Geocast routing [32] is basically a location-based multicast routing approach that aims to deliver
packets from a source vehicle to all other vehicles within a predefined geographical zone. While
useful for use cases such as emergency broadcasts, the communication range is limited by Zone Of
Relevance (ZOR) and it is mainly designed for unidirectional message dissemination in one single
region, not for pairwise communication in the network.
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2.2 Ant Colony Optimization (ACO) algorithm
Inspired by the foraging behavior of ants in nature Dorigo et. al proposed the ACO meta-heuristic
which presents a common framework for approximating solutions to NP-hard optimization
problems [17]. The details of ACO routing algorithm [33] is introduced in section 2.2.2. A review
of the existing ACO-based routing protocols in MANETs [33] is presented afterwards.
2.2.1 Basis of ACO algorithm
Before introducing the ACO routing algorithm in MANETs, the background information of the
nature ants and the artificial ones is presented first.
Ants in nature
Ants are ubiquitous insects which began to diversify 100 million years ago [34]. Now, more than
8800 known species of ants [35] still exist across the globe. In nature, ants are well-known type
of social insects. The size of an ant colony can vary from a few dozen to millions. In an ant
colony, there are usually different castes. "Workers" are the most common ants which could be
found in any colony. They are small sterile females that take over most of the work in the colony:
foraging food, maintaining and expanding the nest, taking care of the queen and brood, and so
on. "Queens" are the fertile females which are the founders of all colonies. The main task of a
queen is to lay eggs. "Drones" are the only male ants in a colony and they only survive during the
mating season. In some special ant colonies, there could also be other castes, such as "soldiers",
which are larger and stronger than typical "workers". As the name indicates, "soldiers" protect
their colony from predators. Although each caste in the colony has different tasks, all castes work
together collectively to ensure the colony’s survival [36], [37]. It’s well-known that a single ant
is not very bright, but ants in a colony can finish remarkable tasks, such as dealing with floods.
In [38] researchers have found that ants can link their body to build self-assemblages. For instance,
in order to beat floods, fire ants are able to use their bodies to build rafts in short time. N. J. Mlot et
al. have also measured the strength and speed by which ant rafts are built in another study [39]. It
shows that thousands of ants can rearrange themselves to build a stable raft within 200 seconds,
and ants can use a force of 400 times their own weight to keep the raft. Observations in [39] and [40]
show that ants can react to their environment quickly and survive under adverse environmental
conditions.
Different from human, ants rarely use sound or sight to exchange information with each other.
Instead, ants produce volatile chemical substance which is known as pheromone. Pheromone is the
key component of ant’s communication. While moving around, ants lay pheromone through their
glands along their path and ants use their antennas to detect the pheromone in the surrounding area.
2.2. ANT COLONY OPTIMIZATION (ACO) ALGORITHM 17
There are different types of pheromone perfumes which represent different chemical words that
the whole ant colony understands. Ants react differently corresponding to the type of pheromone
detected. For instance, in order to alarm nest-mates, some species of ants create alarm pheromones
by using their poison glands [41]. This kind of alarm pheromone includes two components: formic
acid and n-undecane. By detecting the alarm pheromone, worker ants either escape fast or go
towards the danger, in case that they are the defenders of the colony. Another well-known type
of pheromone is the trail pheromone. This kind of pheromone is used by ants while foraging.
An ant foraging for food leaves its nest and chooses randomly a direction to move on, as far as
it doesn’t find a pheromone trail. If it finds one, it has a high probability to follow the trail. No
matter which decision it has made, it deposits pheromone over its route. Once it find the food, it
returns to the nest and reinforces its trail. Other ants which detect its trail will follow the trail with
great probability and lay more pheromone over it. This is a positive feedback loop system since
the higher the trail’s pheromone, the higher the probability of an ant to follow the trail. When
the food is exhausted, no more pheromone is deposit on the trail and the pheromone begins to
evaporate over the time. This negative feedback behavior supports ants to adapt to the dynamic
environment [18].
From nature to artificial ants
Assemblages of ants take on similar functions like those existing in the human societies, but ants
don’t rely on any central control to provide these functions. Therefore, understanding how the
systems of ant colonies work has long been an attractive subject of study. In the 1980s, F. Moyson
and B. Manderick studied self-organization behavior among ants [42]. S. Goss et al. proposed the
initial idea of ant colony optimization algorithms based on their study of the collective behavior
of ants in [43]. In this work, the author designed a simple, yet brilliant experiment: the double
bridge experiment. In this experiment, an ant nest and a food source are connected by a double
bridge which consists of two bridges with different lengths. The experiment’s results indicate that
the short path attracts more ants to follow, if both short and long paths are given to the ants in the
same time. Moreover, the short path attracts much less ants, if it is given after the long path is
followed by the ants for a while. This indicates that the pheromone evaporation rate controls the
trade-off between path-exploration and path-exploitation [18]. Based on the foraging behavior of
ants, M. Dorigo initially proposed the ACO algorithm, the first ant-inspired algorithm aimed to
find an optimal path in a graph, in his dissertation and published it in 1992 [16]. In cooperation
with L. M. Gambardella, M. Dorigo proposed Ant Colony System (ACS) in 1997 [44]. Since then,
research in this area was followed by many other scientists and many popular variations of ACO
algorithms were proposed. B. Bullnheimer, et al. proposed the Rank-based Ant System in 1997 [45].
V. Maniezzo introduced ANTS: exact and approximate nondeterministic tree-search procedures
for the quadratic assignment problem in 1999 [46]. T. Stützle and H. H. Hoos invented MAX-MIN
Ant System (MMAS) [47] in 2000. C. Blum et al. proposed Hyper-Cube framework for Ant Colony
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Optimization (HC-ACO) in 2004 [48].
The ACO meta-heuristic which belongs to the field of SI is inspired by the foraging behavior of ants
in nature. In ACO meta-heuristic, artificial ants work together to find good solutions for difficult
combinatorial optimization problems [17]. Recall in the nature case, an ant deposits pheromone on
its traveled path to mark its trail and inform other ants. When subsequent ants find a trail, they
have a high probability to follow it. Once a subsequent ant follows the trail, it lays down new
pheromone over the path. As consequence, the pheromone of the trail is reinforced and it might
attract more ants to follow. Therefore, the pheromone represents the indirect information exchange
between the individual ants.
In order to apply ACO algorithm to solve an optimization problem in real life, the considered
problem firstly needs to be represented in a way that each potential solution of the problem is
a path in a construction graph [49]. For example, the problem of how to find the optimal path
between the ants’ nest and the food source can be represented in a construction graph as shown in
figure 2.1. Thus, the initial problem is mapped to the new problem on how to find the optimal
path between node N and node F.
2.2.2 ACO-based routing protocols in MANETs
After finding the construction graph, the constraints of the problem should be defined. In this case,
the constraint is that ants can only move on the arcs which connect the nodes in figure 2.1. Each
arc in figure 2.1 can have associated pheromone trails and a heuristic value [17]. The pheromone
trail represents a long-term memory about the ant search process. For each destination there is a
separate pheromone trail assigned to the arc. In contrast, there is only one heuristic value at each
arc and it is a prior knowledge about the problem instance or run-time information provided by
other sources. In many cases, this value is the cost of adding the arc to solution under construction.
In this example, the solution construction is straightforward: every ant in this construction graph
starts at a single node N and aims for the same destination node F. Ants follow a probability
Figure 2.1: A representation example of ACO meta-heuristic.
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decision rule to exploit the network. This probability rule is a function of local pheromone trails
and heuristic information, and it can also be related to the ant’s private memory and the problem
constraints [17]. The common applied probability rule [50] can be represented as equations (2.1)
and (2.2):
Pij(t) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
[τij(t)]α ⋅ [ηij]β∑l∈Ni [τil(t)]α ⋅ [ηil]β , if j ∈ Ni
0 , if j ∉ Ni
(2.1)
(2.2)
Pij(t) is the probability of an ant to move from node i to node j at the tth iteration step or time
slot; Ni is the set of current neighboring nodes of node i; τij(t) is the pheromone intensity on the
arc between node i and j at tth iteration step or time slot; ηij is the heuristic information of the
arc between node i and j and it’s usually a non-increasing function of moving cost from node i to
node j; α and β are weight parameters which control the relative impact of pheromone intensity
τij(t) versus heuristic information ηij . If α value is high, then the pheromone intensity has strong
impact to ants. In this case ants are more biased to follow the path which is chosen popularly by
previous ants. This further leads to a situation in which all ants would eventually construct the
same path. If α value is low, then the ACO algorithm is close to a stochastic greedy algorithm.
When α = 0, ants select the next hop node only based on the heuristic information, eg. cost. In
contrast, ants are attracted only by the pheromone intensity when β = 0. Equation (2.2) shows that
ants can only move to the neighboring nodes.
Once an ant leaves node N , it moves to one of its neighbor nodes according to equation (2.1). Every
artificial ant has a memory space which is used for storing path related information, such as the
nodes visited in its trip. An artificial ant moves hop by hop until it reach the destination node F or
another terminal condition is satisfied, for example the maximum travel hop count of the ant is
reached. If the ant finds the destination node F , it retraces exactly the same path backward to the
start point, node N . Once an ant has constructed a solution, or while building a solution, the ant
evaluates the solution or partial solution to decide the amount of pheromone updates.
The update of pheromone trail can be either increased or decreased. The pheromone update
amount assigned to an arc is calculated based on the quality of a solution in which this arc is
involved, and the pheromone evaporation rate, as shown in equation 2.3 [50].
τij ← (1 − ρ) ⋅ τij + m∑
k=1∆τ
k
ij (2.3)
τij is the pheromone value laid by ants on the arc of node i and node j, namely arc(i, j); ρ ∈ (0,1]
is the pheromone evaporation rate; m is the number of ants; ∆τkij is the amount of pheromone
reinforcement deposited by the kth ant for the arc(i, j) [50]:
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∆τkij =⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
Q/Ck , if arc(i, j) ∈ P k
0 , if arc(i, j) ∉ P k (2.4)(2.5)
Q is a positive application-specific constant; P k is the set of arcs chosen by the kth ant in its path;
Ck is the overall cost function of the current path which is constructed by the kth ant. For example,
Ck can be the length of the path constructed by kth ant or the delay of finding a destination, or the
available bandwidth of the link or the energy consumption of each node along the way and so on.
Which parameters should be considered in the cost function depends on the concrete application.
1 procedure ACOMetaheuristic
2 ScheduleActivities
3 ConstructAntsSolutions
4 UpdatePheromones
5 DaemonActions % optional
6 end-ScheduleActivities
7 end-procedure
Listing 2.1: The ACO meta-heuristic in pseudo-code.
There are many other variations of ACO, the concrete equations applied for path search and
pheromone update could be varied from the ones previously introduced in this section. However,
the ACO algorithm can be generally described as the interplay of three procedures, as shown in
listing 2.1 [17]. ConstructAntsSolutions is the procedure in which a colony of ants concurrently
find the solutions in the construction graph. UpdatePheromones is the process in which ants
modify the pheromone trails. DaemonActions is an optional procedure which is designed for
implementing centralized actions. These three procedures conduct many researchers to design
their own protocols.
The main merit of the ACO meta-heuristic is that it presents a common framework for approximat-
ing solutions to NP-hard optimization problems. Due to the dynamic nature of ACO’s connectivity,
ACO is able to continuously adapt to network changes in real time [18]. Moreover, the artificial
ants can find multiple solutions simultaneously for the considered problem [17]. Therefore, it
makes ACO specially applicable to dynamic problems, such as routing in telecommunication
networks. Since the middle 1990s, the number of applications based on the ACO algorithms has
bloomed. Until now, ACO algorithms have already been applied to solve routing problems in
MANETs and WSNs with better scalability than other approaches.
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2.2.3 Review of ACO-based routing protocols in MANETs
Since the end of 1990s, ant inspired algorithms have been applied to solve routing problems in
network communications. By now, a great number of such approaches exists. In this section,
some well-known ACO-based routing protocols for MANETs are presented. It includes not only
the initial designs which aim at providing optimal routes, but also different approaches which
consider special issues, such as QoS, energy reserves, location information and security during the
route setup process. In order to give a better overview, theses protocols are categorized into five
main directions based on the design purposes of the protocols. Figure 2.2 shows the categorization
scheme in detail.
Basic ACO-based routing protocols
Initially, the optimization property of ACO algorithms has attracted much attention. Inspired by it,
researchers have been motivated to apply ACO algorithms to find optimized routes for network
communications. There are many approaches that belong to this category. In this subsection the
most famous ones are introduced in chronological order.
AntNet G. Di Caro and M. Dorigo have proposed AntNet [51], which is the first representative
ACO-based algorithm for solving the problem of internet routing. In AntNet, each node proactively
sends out Forward ANT (FANT)s to discover a path to a randomly chosen destination node. Once
FANTs reach the destination, Backward ANT (BANT)s are sent back to the source node following
the reverse path. BANTs update the local models of the network status and the local routing
table at each intermediate node. The performance of AntNet is evaluated in three different wired
network scenarios.
Figure 2.2: Types of ACO-based routing protocols in MANETs.
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ARA Another representative ACO-based routing protocol for MANETs, ARA [52] was proposed
by Günes et al.. ARA is an on-demand routing algorithm, which is based on a simple ant colony
optimization meta-heuristic algorithm. The whole routing algorithm consists of three phases: a
route discovery phase, a route maintenance and a route failure handling. The route discovery
phase in ARA is designed in a similar way to AntNet. FANTs and BANTs are used in the route
discovery phase. FANTs are broadcasted by the sender. Duplicate FANTs are identified by their
sequence numbers and are deleted by intermediate nodes. Once FANTs reach their destination
nodes, BANTs are created and sent back to the source nodes. Different from AntNet [51], ARA
uses data packets to maintain the route to avoid the overhead caused by using periodic ants. If a
node recognizes a link failure, it first sets the pheromone value of this link to zero to deactivate it.
Then it searches for an alternative link. If this fails, it informs its neighbors. This process is repeated
until an alternative route has been found or the source node receives a route error message. In the
latter case, the source node will initiate a new route discovery phase if there are still packets to be
sent.
PERA J. S. Baras and H. Mehta have proposed PERA, a proactive routing protocol [53]. PERA
uses ant-like agents to discover the network topology and maintain routes in dynamic networks
such as MANETs. PERA uses three kinds of ants: regular FANTs, uniform FANTs and BANTs.
Regular and uniform FANTs are sent out proactively. These ants explore and reinforce available
routes in the network. Uniform FANTs are routed in a different way than regular FANTs. Instead
of using the routing table at each node, uniform FANTs choose the next hop node with uniform
probability. Uniform FANTs help avoid that previously discovered paths become overloaded.
BANTs are used to adjust the routing tables and statistic tables at each node, according to the
information gathered by FANTs. The authors have compared PERA with AODV [8]. The results
indicate that PERA has lower delay in all cases. However, the throughput of PERA at the higher
speed is slightly less than AODV and the goodput of PERA is lower than AODV in high mobility
scenarios.
AntHocNet Di Caro, Ducatelle and Gambardella have presented a hybrid multi-path routing
algorithm, AntHocNet [54]. In AntHocNet there are six different kinds of ants: Proactive For-
ward ANT (PFANT)s, Proactive Backward ANT (PBANT)s, Reactive Forward ANT (RFANT)s,
Reactive Backward ANT (RBANT)s, RePair Forward ANT (RPFANT)s and RePair Backward
ANT (RPBANT)s. In the reactive route setup process, if a source node has no routing information
about the requested destination node, it broadcasts RFANTs. Otherwise, it unicasts. When this
RFANT reaches the destination, a RBANT is sent back to the source. Along its journey, the RBANT
collects quality information about each link in the path and updates the pheromone table at each
intermediate node. Once the first route is constructed, AntHocNet starts the proactive route mainte-
nance process. Here, source nodes send out PFANTs to their destination nodes. PFANTs consider
both regular and virtual pheromone for choosing the next hop node at each intermediate node.
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Once a PFANT reaches the destination node, it is converted to a PBANT. PBANTs update the
regular pheromone table on their way back to the source node. In case of a link failure, RPFANTs
and RPBANTs are used to handle the problem. The authors have implemented the protocol in
QualNet [55] and investigated its performance using various simulations and comparing the
results to AODV [8].
PACONET E. Osagie et al. have proposed an improved ACO algorithm for routing called
PACONET [56]. In PACONET, a source node reactively broadcasts FANTs in a restricted manner
to explore the network. Each FANT records the total time it has traveled and maintains a list of
all visited nodes. At each intermediate node the FANT updates the pheromone value. Once a
FANT arrives at the destination, a corresponding BANT is generated. The BANT uses the list of
visited nodes recorded by the FANT to travel back to the source node. Along the way, the BANT
also updates the pheromone value in the reverse direction. Different from the AntNet, PACONET
let both FANTs and BANTs update the pheromone. The performance of PACONET has been
compared with AODV [8].The results show that PACONET has less end to end delay and routing
control overhead than AODV, but the packet delivery ratio is nearly the same.
ACO-AHR W. Yu et al. have proposed a hybrid routing algorithm ACO-AHR [57], which
includes reactive routing setup and proactive routing probe and maintenance. There are two
kinds of agents: ant agents and service agents. The ant agent are FANTs and BANTs as in other
ACO-based routing algorithms. In the reactive routing setup process, a source node broadcasts
FANTs. Along the trip, each FANT records all the nodes it has visited in order to avoid cycles in
the path. Each BANT carries all the information collected by the corresponding FANT. It calculates
the delay from one intermediate node to the destination node. Once a BANT ant reaches the source
node, a service agent is created. The service agent updates the routing table at intermediate nodes
by using the information gathered by the BANT. In the proactive routing maintenance process,
proactive FANTs are sent out while the data session is ongoing. The proactive FANTs are normally
unicasted, but they could be broadcasted with a small probability. In the latter case, the FANTs
may be able to find new paths.
HOPENT HOPENT is proposed by J. Wang et al. in [58]. It is based on the zone routing
framework, combined with an ACO algorithm. HOPENT performs local proactive route discovery
within a node’s neighborhood and reactive communication between neighborhoods. HOPENT
is simulated on GlomoSim [59] and the authors have compared HOPNET with several famous
routing protocols, such as AODV [8], AntHocNet [54], and ZRP [60]. The results indicate that
HOPNET is highly scalable for large networks in comparison with AntHocNet [54]. Moreover, the
author also varied the zone radius in the experiments and results indicate that the selection of the
zone radius has considerable effect on the performance.
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Ant-E S. Sethi and S. K. Udgata have proposed an ACO-based on-demand routing protocol
Ant-E [61]. Ant-E uses Blocking Expanding Ring Search (Blocking-ERS) [62] to limit overhead and
controls local retransmission to improve PDR. The authors compared Ant-E with AODV [8] and
DSR [9]. The results show that Ant-E performs better.
Summary In this section, some of the representative protocols which were proposed in the early
stage of ACO-based routing protocols are introduced. The first ACO-based routing protocol,
AntNet, proposed in 1998, gave a good example of how to apply the ACO algorithm in commu-
nication networks. In the following ten years, many subsequent researchers proposed various
ACO-based routing protocols for MANETs based on this idea. Protocols in this category aimed for
finding the optimal routes in dynamically changing networks and their performance indicated
that ACO is a promising solution for routing problems in MANETs. This further encouraged
researchers to design novel ACO-based routing protocols which consider other issues, such as
QoS, energy consumption and so on.
QoS aware ACO-based routing protocols
QoS has always been a focus of attention in mobile ad hoc networks. It is a challenging problem
when transmitting packets via multiple paths in a dynamic network. At the same time, the
pheromone concept from ant colony algorithms also inspires many authors to use QoS parameters
for selecting routes.
ARAMA ARAMA [63] is an early proactive routing algorithm proposed by O. Hussein and T.
Saadawi. The FANTs in ARAMA gather both local and global path information, which could be
the QoS parameters such as the remaining battery energy, delay, numbers of hops, etc. ARAMA
defines a local normalized link index which is a good measure for overall path information. Once
the FANT reaches the destination, the path grade is calculated based on this path index. A BANT
follows the reverse path to the source node and updates the pheromone table at each hop.
SAMP-DSR SAMP-DSR [64] is proposed by E. Khosrowshahi-Asl et al., which aims to solve
the shortcomings of both ACO and DSR [9] algorithms. In SAMP-DSR, each node can operate in
two modes, called “local mode” and “global mode”. Depending on the rate of network topology
change, nodes switch between the two modes, in order to help the ants converge efficiently.
QAMR QAMR [65] is a QoS-enabled ant colony based multipath routing protocol for MANETs
which is proposed by Krishna et al. It selects paths based on Next Hop Availability (NHA) and
the path preference probability. The NHA is defined as the availability of nodes and links for
routing on a path, considering both mobility and the energy factors. In order to find the best path
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that satisfying the QoS constraints, QAMR uses a path preference probability which measures
different parameters such as delay, bandwidth and hop count. However, there are many extra
control messages for estimating the quality of outgoing links.
QoRA A. Al-ani and J. Seitz have introduced QoS Routing protocol for multi-rate ad hoc networks
based on Ant colony optimization (QoRA) [66]. In order to reduce the overhead when collecting
information from multiple paths and to avoid congestion during data transmission, this paper
uses Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) [67] to estimate QoS parameters locally.
The proposed mechanism consists of two components: the QoRA entity and the SNMP entity.
The QoRA entity runs on every node to identify a suitable route that meets the specified QoS
requirements, while the SNMP entity collects detailed information about the characteristics of
the outgoing links such as bandwidth, delay and packet loss. More specifically, the QoRA entity
consists of five components: the neighbor table, the routing table, the ant Management, the decision
engine and the QoS manager. while the two tables are common components of a routing protocols,
the other three components are specially designed for QoRA. The ant management is responsible
for generating FANTs, BANTs and Error ANT (EANT)s, all of which contain specific information
necessary to provide QoS-aware routing and to identify pheromone deposits. The QoRA decision
engine is a vital part which decides which of the different ants are to be sent and which updates
the neighbor and routing table. The QoS manager acts as a command generator and notification
receiver application. It also calculates QoS parameters locally based on communication with the
SNMP entity. QoRA consists of five phases regarding route discovery and route maintenance.
The first phase is the forward phase. The source node broadcasts a FANT to the network to find
the best route to the destination. Before forwarding the packets, each intermediate node checks
the Forward ANT Stack (FANTStack) to avoid loops and whether the given QoS requirements
are satisfied. In the packet forwarding phase, intermediate nodes read the flow information and
randomly forward the packets based on a probability roulette-wheel selection scheme [68] using
the data in its routing table. The Backward phase starts after the destination node receives FANTs.
The destination node calculates the residual QoS values and sends a BANT back to its neighbors.
The BANT collects route quality information, refreshes the routing table, updates the pheromone
and computes the QoS threshold. The Monitoring phase is mainly used for avoiding congestion
problems by monitoring decreasing transmitting speeds. For each flow, QoRA communicates
with the SNMP entity to calculate QoS parameters locally. If the required QoS is not satisfied in
a certain period time (a monitoring window), the affected node broadcasts an EANT to inform
the previous nodes about the congestion problem. When a node detects the loss of a link to a
neighboring node, it deletes the information about this neighbor node from the neighbor table and
updates the route table by finding an alternative path using EANTs. QoRA does not require either
exchanging additional control packets or synchronizing nodes with the help of the SNMP entity. It
computes QoS parameters locally to reduce overhead. The computation of QoS parameters is all
loaded to the SNMP entity which allows QoRA to reduce end-to-end delay. Although it is clear
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that the QoRA entity requires less overhead, the communication between the QoRA entity and
SNMP entities consumes more energy and bandwidth.
Summary In this section five representative protocols which focus on QoS fulfillment are dis-
cussed. QoS has always been a vital task for data transmission in MANETs. The approaches focus
mainly on the parameters: link stability and hop count. Other common QoS related improvements
are a reduction in overhead produced by control messages and the ability to eschew the require-
ment of time synchronization. Many other QoS parameters such as link delay, remaining battery
energy, end to end reliability and bandwidth are treated as pheromone reinforce factors in above
protocols.
Energy aware ACO-based routing protocols
In general, energy efficiency is one of the key parameters which should be considered while
designing new routing protocols for wireless mobile networks and especially for WSNs. As shown
before in section 2.2.3, some of the proposed ACO-based routing protocols for MANETs have
used nodes’ power reserves as a criterion in QoS computation. However, many conventional
routing protocols suffer from sudden deaths of nodes in the network, because packets are always
transmitted through the shortest paths. Therefore, nodes which participate in the shortest paths
consume more power than other nodes. Network load imbalance leads to a reduction of network’s
lifetime. This problem recently has received more attention and many energy-efficient protocols
which aim to extend network lifetime are proposed. The ACO-EEAODR [69] and Energy-Aware
Ant based Routing (EAAR) [70] protocols are two earlier attempts in this direction.
ACO-EEAODR I. Woungang et al. [69] have improved an energy-efficient ad hoc on-demand
routing protocol by embedding an ACO algorithm into it, calling the result ACO-EEAODR. It
considers both the remaining battery power and the length of the path, while selecting the most
energy-efficient path. There is a trade-off between the two parameters. Due to the priority of
energy efficiency in this protocol, the weight of the first criterion is set to 0.7. Moreover, the updates
of pheromone values in each node are also based on the remaining battery power. Therefore, an
ant prefers hopping to a node with higher battery power rather than following the shortest path.
EAAR The EAAR [70] protocol is proposed by S. Misra et al.. In order to increase the battery
life of a node, it considers both multi-path transmission and power consumption in forwarding a
packet. The residual battery capacity is also considered in the proposed algorithm. The Maximum
of the Minimum Residual Battery energy (MRB) of a route and the hop count are used to update
the pheromone in the routing table during the route discovery phase. The results show that EAAR
has the minimal energy consumption in the overall network and a low packets loss rate compared
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to AntHocNet [54]. However, the energy consumption per packet and the delivery rate are not as
superior as the previous mentioned two parameters in high mobility scenarios. This is probably
because EAAR needs more time to select the best route for data transmission.
AntHocMMP P. Vijayalakshmi et al. have proposed a robust energy efficient ACO routing
algorithm named AntHocMMP [71], which uses ant agents to find optimal paths based on the
Max-Min-Path (MMP) approach. The proposed algorithm first selects a set of relative paths from
the source node to the destination by using the MMP algorithm. In the second phase FANTs
are broadcast on all relative paths. While traversing along the relative paths, FANTs update the
pheromone values at each intermediate node, to find the shortest and most robust path. Additional,
AntHocMMP uses an adaptive re-transmission approach to detect link failure and select new
relative paths. However, in the first phase the MMP algorithm has already traversed all the
possible energy efficient paths from the source to destination and the pheromone deposits do not
affect the selection of relative paths. Therefore, in this approach, the ACO algorithm is not used for
finding possible paths, but for selecting the optimal path. This two procedure based approach is
different from conventional ACO-based routing approaches.
ACECR J. Zhou et al. [72] have introduced the Ant Colony based Energy Control Routing
(ACECR) protocol for MANETs. Different from the EAAR [70] which considers only the residual
battery power of nodes, ACECR takes both the average energy and the minimum energy of a
path into account, in order to select a path with more residual energy when considered from a
global view. During the route discovery phase BANTs update not only the pheromone table by
calculating the minimum and summing up of the nodes’ residual energy values, but also the
average energy of a path and hop count. The pheromone amount represents how good the path is
to transmit a data packet. The authors have tested the protocol’s performance with three different
mobility models, namely the random walk mobility model, the Random WayPoint model (RWP)
model [73] and reference point group mobility. All the simulation results show that ACECR has
better performance than EAAR with respect to the data packet delivery ratio, routing load ratio,
energy consumption of nodes and average end-to-end delay.
Hybrid ACO Recently, S. B. Prabaharan and R. Ponnusamy [74] have proposed a hybrid ACO
routing protocol that emphasizes the security and energy efficiency. This protocol is abbreviated
as Hybrid ACO from here on. In contrast to the conventional ACO routing protocols, this hybrid
ACO routing approach selects the next hop node by using Simulated Annealing (SA). SA is a
probabilistic approach which has a low probability of sinking into local optima. In the initial phase
of the transmission, each link in the network is given a trust value as the initial pheromone value.
Once the source node needs to discover a new route, it sends out FANTs. Before moving to the
next hop, each FANT shortlists five neighboring nodes of the current node, marked with L1, using
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SA. Each of the selected neighboring node shortlists five of its own neighboring nodes, marked
with L2, also using SA. The best node of L2 is identified based on the trust values. Once the best
L2 node is selected, the corresponding upstream node from L1 is also identified. Then the FANT
moves to this identified node in L1. After each movement of the FANT, the trust values of all the
links are updated. For links which the FANT hasn’t visited, the trust values evaporate at a constant
rate. The same methodology is repeated until the FANT arrives at the destination node or the
maximum path length is reached. The novelty of this proposal is mainly that FANTs identify the
next hop node by comparing trust values of 25 selected nodes in a two hop distance. Moreover, in
order to find routes with minimal node reuse and to distribute the load through the network, this
hybrid ACO routing protocol has incorporated randomness into the system to determine the paths.
With the help of randomness during path selection, the energy depletion of certain centralized
nodes is reduced. This enhances network stability further. However, the definitions of trust value
related metrics, for example the stability, and the selection of the appropriate weight values for
each metric are not clearly described.
Summary The energy reserve parameter used to be just one of many of QoS requirements, but
in recent years it has become a popular topic in MANETs by itself. Repeatedly using the shortest
path will drain the battery of the nodes on it, reducing their lifetime compared to other nodes. This
will also decrease the lifetime of the network as a whole. The reviewed protocols in this section,
all use the remaining battery power as a critical pheromone reinforcement factor to achieve high
energy efficiency and extend the lifetime of the network. Another notable point is that most of the
protocols in this section achieve lower energy consuming at the expense of the route discovery
delay and the path length.
Location aware ACO-based routing protocols
With the utilization of the GPS [75], the location information of nodes becomes a popular issue
when applying the routing protocols in practical. In this section six respective location aware ACO
routing protocols are introduced in short. The survey paper [76] gives more details.
POSANT S. Kamali et al. [77] proposed an early reactive POSition based ANT colony routing
protocol (POSANT) for MANETs. It combines the location information with traditional ACO
routing algorithm, which aims to reduce the route establishment time while keeping less number
of control messages. POSANT assumes that each node knows about its position, the position of
its neighbors and the destination node. Then it uses the concept of zone which divides a node’s
neighborhood into three zones based on the physical location. For route discovery, the source node
sends one FANT to each area on demand.
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Robustness-ACO Unlike POSANT, D. Kadono et al. [78] have proposed a position aware ACO
routing approach in MANETs which requires no location service. The proposed protocol is
abbreviated as Robustness-ACO from here on. This paper constructs paths based on the robustness
using the GPS information of visited nodes. The authors present two robustness functions to
calculate the robustness value of a link. Based on this robustness value, the artificial ants decide
the amount of pheromone to lay down. Each node predicts link disconnections by using the
GPS information of its neighbors and redistributes the pheromone to accelerate alternative path
construction. This mechanism is better adapted to dynamic network change and frequent link
disconnection. The successful implementations of ACO-based routing protocol in MANETs [2]
inspire the applications in VANETs [4]. VANET is a special type of MANETs which generally
consists of a group of vehicles with a relatively high speed.
MAR-DYMO S. L. O. B. Correia et al. [79] have likely proposed the first ant-based algorithm that
adapted to DYnamic MANETs On-demand routing protocol (DYMO) in vehicle ad hoc networks.
The vehicles’ information, such as speed and position, is applied to help updating the pheromone
and making routing decision. Moreover, during the pheromone deposit process, MAR-DYMO
uses Nakagami Fading Model [80] to indicate the path quality while utilizing Kinetic Graph
framework [81] to show the link’s stability. However, this mechanism consumes large amount
of bandwidth and is not scalable [82]. The authors have simulated the vehicle mobility with the
Vehicular Network Movement Generator (VNMG) [83] and implemented the proposed protocol in
NS-2 simulator [84].
MAZACORNET In [82] H. Rana et al. introduce a hybrid ant based routing protocol for VANETs
that first divides the networks into zones to achieve scalability. To reduce broadcasting and
congestion, they use a proactive approach within the zones to find routes and a reactive approach
between zones. In MAZACORNET, the pheromone deposition and evaporation model is the same
as with MAR-DYMO [79]. The difference is MAZACORNET uses five types of ants to discover
the route within or outside the zone, and two routing tables to maintain the routing information.
However, this paper does not explain how zones could be formed in a fast dynamic VANET.
Cluster-based ACO Unlike the flat architecture of the zone-based hybrid ACO routing protocol,
a hierarchical approach for VANETs is proposed by S. Balaji et al. [85]. It combines a clustering
architecture with ACO routing procedures to enhance the scalability with a better organization
for the network. This protocol is abbreviated as Cluster-based ACO from here on. To achieve
an efficient management, this protocol firstly divides the network into multiple virtual clusters
by broadcasting a MEmber Packet (MEP). After autonomous clustering, ACO-DYMO routing
procedures are employed in the same way as in MAR-DYMO [79]. One notable idea in this protocol
is that it uses a reactive approach instead of using a hybrid approach which is otherwise commonly
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applied in cluster-based networks.
S-AMCQ In recent year, M. H. Eiza et al. [86] have proposed a Secure Ant based Multi-
Constrained QoS routing algorithm (S-AMCQ) for vehicle ad hoc networks, which considers
not only QoS constraints, but also the security issues. In route discovery process, S-AMCQ applies
ACO algorithm to explore numerous routes which satisfy multiple QoS constraints. And it uses
an authentication mechanism to defend against external attackers. For the detection of internal
attackers, S-AMCQ utilizes an extended VANET-oriented Evolving Graph (VoEG) model to per-
form plausibility checks on routing control messages. It also protects vehicles’ privacy by using
pseudonymous certificates. However, the authentication process in S-AMCQ is centralized and
requires a Certification Authority (CA) that shows it is designed for Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I)
communications.
Summary The protocols introduced in this section represent a steady development of location
aware ACO routing algorithms that leverage GPS. POSTAN [77] minimizes message delivery
delay, while Robustness-ACO [78] combines robustness-based path construction with predictions
of link disconnection. After the successful implementation in MANETs, many new ACO-based
routing protocols are also designed for VANETs. MAR-DYMO [79] guarantees both link quality
and stability. In order to improve the performance, researchers focus on modifying MAR-DYMO
into two architectures, namely zone-based and cluster-based architectures. MAZACORNET [82]
subdivides the networks into zones to achieve scalability. A proactive approach is used within the
zones while a reactive approach is applied between zones. Different from MAZACORNET, Cluster-
based ACO [85] aims to reduce the number of routing control packets. However, message delivery
in the network after the autonomous clustering is not described. S-AMCQ [86] considers both
the QoS constraints and the security issues to ensure reliable and robust routing in VANETs. In
general, location aware ACO routing protocol have been well developed and show good prospects.
Security aware ACO-based routing protocols
Other than QoS and energy efficiency, security is another hot topic in routing protocols which
attracts many researchers’ attention. As is well-known there exist many security threats in the
network layer, such as black hole attacks, wormhole attacks, flooding attacks and so on. When
these attacks are launched during the routing process, this usually leads to strong harmful effects
on the network. In the worst cases, an attacker might even make the communication in the network
impossible. Therefore, mechanisms that helps participants in a network to defend against the
potential attacks are necessary. However, the scope of security is wide. Different researchers
have their own ideas about how to best build defense systems. In this section, an overview about
existing security aware ACO-based routing protocols is presented.
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SAR-ECC V. Vijayalakshmi and T.G. Palanivelu [87] have proposed a secure ant based routing
algorithm for cluster based ad hoc networks using Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) [88], which
is abbreviated as SAR-ECC from here on. This approach makes use of two basic processes: one is
estimating the trust value between neighbor nodes. The other uses the AntNet routing mechanism
for route discovery and ECC for mutual authentication between the source and destination. In
the network, each node in the cluster keeps trust values for all its neighbors. A trust value is
calculated based on a measurement of uncertainty and is an increasing function that correlates
with the probability of successfully transmitting each packet. During route establishment, the
source node tries to find multiple routes using AntNet [51]. Then it gathers the trust values of
all nodes in the paths. Based on the trustworthiness of nodes, it selects a trustworthy route for
data transmission. The novelty of the protocol is using a trust value based on a measurement
of uncertainty instead of the conventional pheromone. However, the updating mechanism for
the trust value is not described and the benefits of combining a cluster structure with an ACO
algorithm is not clearly described.
SPA-ARA Secure Power-Aware Ant Routing Algorithm (SPA-ARA) inspired by ACO algorithms
is proposed by S.Mehfuz and M.N.Doja [89]. SPA-ARA aims to not only manage energy usage, but
also to guarantee security in MANETs. Similar to other ACO-based routing protocols, SPA-ARA
also launches ants to explore the network. Once a source node needs to send data packets to
one destination node, it checks its pheromone table first. If there exists route information, it
chooses the corresponding node as the next hop for which the next-hop availability is maximum.
Afterwards, data packets secured by a Message Authentication Code (MAC) are transmitted along
stochastically chosen routes by using the pheromone tables along the whole route. If there is no
route information about the particular destination, the source node sends out reactive FANTs.
These reactive FANTs are also attached with the MAC, which is generated using the HMAC keyed
hash algorithm [90] with a shared group key. After receiving the reactive FANTs, intermediate
nodes check first whether the attached MAC is valid. If it is correct, the intermediate node
determines the trust value of the previous hop by looking it up in own trust pheromone table. Only
if this trust value is above a predefined threshold value, the intermediate node accepts the FANT
and establishes a secret key with the previous hop node by using a two-party key establishment
protocol. This secret key is used for verifying the BANT later. As a consequence, a secret key is set
up between each pair of neighboring nodes along the route. Once the destination node receives
the FANT, it reacts analogously to the intermediate nodes. Only if the FANT has a valid MAC
and the trust value of the previous hop is above the threshold, the destination node generates a
corresponding BANT. Otherwise, it discards the FANT without taking any further action. This
BANT is secured with a MAC generated with the secret key between the destination node and the
next hop in the path towards the source node. Intermediate nodes verify the MAC attached to the
BANT by using the corresponding secret keys hop by hop. When the BANT successfully arrives
the source node, it has also updated all the pheromone tables along its journey. Based on the
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attached MACs and pairwise secret keys, the ants finish the authentication process in the reactive
path setup phase. The authors have written that SPA-ARA could protect the network from most
common attacks on routing protocols for ad hoc networks and have compared its performance
with the Source Routing Protocol (SRP) [91] protocol. The results show that SPA-ARA has longer
lifetime than SRP, and attackers lead to less dropped packets in SPA-ARA. In order to maximize
network lifetime, the number of hops, travel time and the batteries’ remaining energy are chosen
as the optimization parameters, which directly affect the pheromone updating process. Going
from these results, SPA-ARA has the lowest energy level standard deviation when compared to
the AODV [8], DSR [9] and ARA [52] protocols. It also discovers the most successful routes. The
proposed scheme pays attention not only to security, but also to the nodes’ remaining energy so as
to achieve a fair distribution of energy usage. Due to the cryptographic mechanism frequently used
in the MAC and when broadcasting FANTs in the route discovery phase, overhead is one of most
critical parameters for evaluating the performance of the proposed routing protocol. However, the
authors haven’t shown any results regarding overhead.
FTAR Fuzzy logic has been widely utilized in many areas of the daily life. Since the 1980s,
many fuzzy logic based systems have been proposed in many fields, such as automatic control,
automobile production, academic education, industrial manufacturing and so on [?]. Due to its
great success, researchers [92], [93], [94], [95] have designed new routing protocols in MANETs,
combining fuzzy logic with ACO algorithms. S. Sethi and S. K. Udgata [96] have proposed the
Fuzzy-based Trusted Ant Routing (FTAR) protocol in 2011. FTAR combines swarm intelligence
and the fuzzy system to select the optimal path. In the route discovery phase, it follows the
same concepts as those used in many other conventional ACO routing protocols. FANTs travel
through the network hop by hop using Blocking-ERS [62]. In order to prevent cycles in the path,
each intermediate node stores recently forwarded route requests in a buffer. BANTs travel back
along the routes of their corresponding FANTs until they reach the source node. After pheromone
Figure 2.3: Fuzzy system for trusted node.
2.2. ANT COLONY OPTIMIZATION (ACO) ALGORITHM 33
tracks are established between source and destination nodes, data packets update the pheromone
values along the path while they are transmitted to the destination node. If there is no data
communication in the network, pheromone values evaporate with the time. If a node does not
receive an acknowledgment within predefined interval, it generates a route error message and the
pheromone value of the related routes reduce to 0. Meanwhile, the node tries to deliver the data
packet to the destination via alternative routes. FTAR aims to distinguish between healthy and
malicious nodes, and has introduced a fuzzy-based trusted node model. In this model each node
is assigned a trust value signifying its trustfulness. As shown in figure 2.3, input parameters for
the fuzzy control are chosen to be the dropped packets and time ratio, which represents the ratio
between the route reply time and the time-to-live. The membership functions of the two input
and single output parameters are assumed to be Gaussian functions. Each input parameter is
categorized into four levels; and the output parameter is appraised by five levels. A series of rules
are defined for the Fuzzy Inference System (FIS). Smallest Of Minimum (SOM) is applied for the
defuzzification process. After the fuzzy process, the fuzzy trust value is evaluated. It can affect the
route discover phase, because FANTs only choose trusted neighbor nodes on their paths. In the
presence of unsafe or malicious nodes, the results show an improvement over the Ant-U algorithm.
However, the authors neither explain how they obtain the input parameters for their fuzzy control
system, nor do they give a detailed explanation of how to use the fuzzy based trust value in the
ACO routing structure. Due to these reasons, FTAR is not re-implemented in this thesis. Moreover,
the authors compared FTAR only with an algorithm called "Ant-U" which was not introduced
in the paper or anywhere else. The lack of comparison between FTAR and other security aware
routing protocols or even regular state of the art routing protocols reduces the usefulness of their
evaluation and makes their results hard to appreciate.
SBDT G. Indirani and K. Selvakumar [97] have proposed Swarm Based intrusion detection and
Detection Technique (SBDT) in 2012. It uses the swarm intelligence of ant colony optimization
to establish multiple paths between source and destination nodes. Nodes with high trust values,
residual bandwidth and energy are selected as Node Active (NA)s. Each NA monitors its neighbor
nodes and collects all their trust values. NAs also exchange the gathered trust values with their
neighbor NAs. If a node’s trust value is below a predefined minimum trust value, the NAs mark it
as malicious. Upon detecting a malicious node, the NA node informs a transmission’s source node
about the detection. In order to defend against the malicious node, the source node performs a key
revocation process. In this approach, the trust value is a core factor to support the whole detection
system. However, the authors haven’t mentioned how the trust values are estimated and updated.
DBA-ACO Other than designing intrusion detection systems, researchers are also interested in
preventing certain attacks. K. S. Sowmya et al. [98] have proposed an idea to prevent black hole
attacks using the ACO routing structure, which is abbreviated as DBA-ACO from here on. The
approach follows the conventional ACO routing protocols to discover routes. In order to detect
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black hole node, a dynamically updated threshold value is used. The threshold value is the average
difference of the destination sequence numbers in the routing table and those brought back by the
BANTs. If a BANT brings back a destination sequence number which is higher than the threshold
value, the node who forwards this BANT is then considered a black hole node. Once a black hole
node is detected, alarm packets with the black hole node’s ID are distributed through the network.
Hence, the nodes of the network can isolate the malicious node. This approach avoids the usage of
any cryptographic mechanisms to ensure security in the routing protocol. However, the authors
have not performed any simulation to test the performance of the proposed idea.
ANTNET S. Pal et al. [99] have found another way of detecting black hole attacks. They apply
ACO to the AODV [8] routing mechanism, calling it ANTNET. This protocol first uses AODV to
gather paths and then applies the ANTNET algorithm to detect the anomalies. Finally, it uses the
ACO mechanism to rediscover paths. However, the update mechanism of the pheromone is not
mentioned and there is no description about the concrete reactions after detecting the black hole
nodes.
ABPKM P. Memarmoshrefi et al. have proposed [100] Autonomous Bio-inspired Public Key
Management (ABPKM) approached for MANETs to defend against network layer attacks. The
main idea is to apply ACO for self-organized public key management to prevent nodes’ misbe-
havior and ensure the correctness of the public keys. The trust value in this approach is estimated
based on identity assurance, which means the level at which the public key being presented can
be trusted to represent a particular node and not some other nodes in the network. In order to
combine the trust based public key mechanism with an ACO algorithm, the authors use the trust
value as the pheromone value in the ACO algorithm. The proposed approach consists of four main
parts: the initialization phase and certificate issuing, the certificate chain discovery, the public key
authentication by certificate verification and the certificate chain trust/pheromone update. In first
phase, public key certificates are issued by each node to its neighboring nodes upon receiving
the corresponding public keys and the initial trust/pheromone value to all issued certificates are
set with the threshold value 0.5. Once a source node wants to authenticate the public key of a
destination node, the source node sends out FANTs to find desired certificate chains from the
source node to the destination node. The route discovery process is similar to that of conventional
ACO routing protocols, except the BANTs also carry certificate chains. After the source node has
found the certificate chains, it needs to authenticate the public key represented by those chains.
It retrieves the public key of the destination node from the received chains and computes the
corresponding trust values of the chains. The route represented by the chain with highest trust
value is chosen for data transmission. Based on the results of the public key authentication process,
the source node updates the trust values of its neighboring nodes. The updating is launched hop by
hop along the chains. Nodes in a chain without any fake certificate are rewarded with increasing
trust values. In contrast, nodes in a chain which includes fake certificates are punished by their
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upstream nodes. In this paper, the authors have investigated the scalability and robustness of
ABPKM by varying network size, mobility and the percentage of malicious nodes. The simulation
results show that ABPKM provides good performance over a wide range of scenarios and remains
stable for all tested network sizes. The novelty in this protocol is connecting the trust value from
public key management with the pheromone in ACO algorithms. This design lets ABPKM reap
benefits from both sides. After their first design, the authors have improved the model in [101] to
detect more complex attacks, such as Sybil attacks, during the public key authentication phase.
They add the agglomerative hierarchical clustering algorithm to ABPKM and analyze the nodes’
behavior with a new Sybil attack detection model. Based on the gathered certificate chains, the
source node extracts node features, such as the number of groups one node belongs to, the distance
of a node to the destination node, the social degree of one node and the average trust value for
the chains in which the node participates. These features help the source node to group other
nodes during the clustering process. Another interesting parameter which is inspired from mate
and non-mate discrimination in real ant colonies, the aggression value, is also newly introduced
in the model. This value is used to estimate the danger level of one node in the network. After
the clustering process, the node’s aggression values are estimated. In their following work [102],
they give additional simulation results. These show, based on an experimentally determined best
cutoff point and aggression threshold values respectively for different network sizes, that moving
nodes have a generally better accuracy for detecting the attacker nodes. However, these results are
from the learning phase of the ACO-based autonomous authentication model. The performance
of a complete routing protocol including the proposed detection mechanisms still needs to be
investigated.
Summary This section has surveyed some of the existing security aware ACO-based routing
protocols in chronological order. Based on the aims of these protocols, they can be divided into
two groups: general and targeted, as shown in figure 2.2. The first group aims to generally detect
anomalies in the network, while the other one targets a particular attack (e.g. black hole attacks). If
only looking at the security model applied in these protocols, 71 % of them are trust based models.
There are different ways to set up trust models. S. Sethi and S. K. Udgata [96] have applied the fuzzy
logic to estimate the trust values in their protocol FTAR, while the other researchers [87], [89], [100]
have applied authentication mechanisms to create their own trust models. From the observations,
it shows that the combination of fuzzy logic and ACO could be well suited to improving the
security in MANETs. However, choosing suitable parameters which should be considered in the
fuzzy system is very important in order to estimate accurate trust values. The choice may be
strongly influenced by the design aims of the protocol and also related to the experiences obtained
by the designer. For example, the rule base which is used within a fuzzy system is usually made by
experience and it can strongly affect the output results. More research which explores or discusses
these open issues in this area are needed. Authentication mechanisms are an important feature
used to improve the security in wireless networks. 80 % of the trust based models in this section
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have applied such mechanism. SPA-ARA [89] is one representative example of an authentication
based approach in this section. The authors have pointed out that SPA-ARA can detect most of the
common attacks in MANETs. However, due to the cryptographic mechanism frequently used for
authentication, overhead is one of the most critical parameters for evaluating the performance of
the proposed routing protocols.
Other ACO-based routing protocols
Instead of focusing only on a single issue such as QoS, energy, security, etc., researchers have also
proposed other ACO-based routing protocols which consider two or more issues in the same time.
In previous sections some of them are already reviewed. For instance, SPA-ARA [89], introduced
in section 2.2.3, considers both energy and security in the routing process. Another example is
S-AMCQ [86] in section 2.2.3, which considers the QoS and security in VANETs communication.
Considering multiple issues in a routing protocol’s design can make the protocol more suitable
for real world applications. However, this is a new direction that has not been investigated
by many researchers yet. Therefore, they are not categorized into a separate group. However,
designing ACO routing protocols based on the multiple existing issues in MANETs and especially
in VANETs, would be an interesting future research direction.
2.2.4 Analytical comparison of ACO-based routing protocols for MANETs
In this section the previously surveyed ACO-based routing protocols, which cover the time from
1998 to 2016, are summarized and compared based on the design patterns of these ACO-based
routing protocols. Ten tables in this section show an analytical comparison of all the protocols
according to the categories introduced in the previous section: basic optimization, QoS awareness,
location awareness, energy awareness and security awareness.
Analytical parameters
The following seven parameters are chosen to compare the different ACO-based routing protocols:
Design goals: This parameter explains the aims of the proposed protocols. The goals usually
indicate the categories which the routing protocol belongs to.
Ant types: In conventional ACO-based routing protocols, there are usually two types of ants:
FANTs and BANTs. However, depending on the design of the protocols, there could be other
types of ants in the network. This parameter lists all types of ants in the protocol.
Pheromone reinforcement factors (Ph. reinforcement): Pheromone is one of the most impor-
tant parts in ACO-based routing protocols. This parameter specifies what is considered while
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reinforcing the pheromone values in the algorithm.
Table 2.1: Design parameter overview of basic ACO-based routing protocols
Protocol Routing Approach Tran. Type FANT Ph. Activator
AntNet [51] proactive unicast BANTs
ARA [52] reactive broadcast FANTs, BANTs, DPs
PERA [53] proactive unicast BANTs
AntHocNet [54] hybrid both RBANTs, PBANTs
PACONET [56] hybrid broadcast FANTs, BANTs
ACO-AHR [57] hybrid both service agents
HOPENT [58] hybrid unicast FANTs, BANTs
Ant-E [61] reactive broadcast FANTs, BANTs, DPs
© 2017 IEEE
Table 2.2: Pheromone parameter overview of basic ACO-based routing protocols
Protocol Design Goals Ant Types Pheromone
Reinforcement Evaporation
AntNet [51]
distributed, robust,
multi-path routing FANT, BANT
goodness of
trip time
goodness of
trip time
ARA [52] reduce overhead FANT, BANT hop count constant rate
PERA [53] reduce overhead
FANT, BANT,
uniform FANT
delay, hop count,
trip time
delay, hop count,
trip time
AntHocNet [54] efficient routing
PFANT, PBANT,
RFANT, RBANT,
RPFANT, RPBANT
hop count,
delay constant rate
PACONET [56]
efficient
dynamic routing FANT, BANT
travel time,
run time parameter constant rate
ACO-AHR [57]
apply multi-agents
to reduce expense FANT, BANT
travel time,
ant release ration constant rate
HOPENT [58]
high scalability,
less overhead
IFANT,EFANT,
BANT,NANT,EANT travel time constant rate
Ant-E [61]
control overhead,
improve reliability FANT, BANT hop count constant rate
© 2017 IEEE
Pheromone evaporation factors (Ph. evaporation): In ant colonies pheromone evaporates over
time [17]. This allows ants to forget old paths. This parameter specifies what is considered while
evaporating the pheromone values in the algorithm.
Routing approach: This parameter signifies if the routing protocol is proactive, reactive or hybrid.
Transmission type of FANTs (Tran. Type FANTs): This parameter explains the type of transmis-
sion for FANTs. The types used in all reviewed protocols in this work are unicast and broadcast.
Pheromone update activators (Ph. Activators): Pheromone in ACO-based routing protocols
changes dynamically. This parameter explains where the pheromone is updated in the routing
protocol.
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The parameters mentioned before are divided into two groups, for example, as shown in table 2.1
and Table 2.2: the common basic design properties and the pheromone related core design proper-
ties. The first group introduces the basic routing structure, while the other group reflects the core
ACO mechanism within the routing protocol. In the following subsections, results are presented in
the form of these two kinds of comparison tables, dividing up the algorithms according to five
categories that are previously introduced. In addition, each section’s results are summarized.
Comparison of basic ACO-based routing protocols
Table 2.1 summarizes various basic optimization ACO-based routing protocols for MANETs.
Many of them are representative algorithms in this category, such as AntNet [51], ARA [52], etc.
Routing protocols could be classified into proactive, reactive and hybrid approaches, which is
listed in the path establishment column. Overall, 75 % of the studied protocols in this category
have a reactive or hybrid routing design, instead of using a proactive design, which usually
causes more overhead for maintaining routing tables. This trend reflects the requirements of
ad hoc network. Generally speaking, broadcasting a message produces more control messages,
because the message needs to be transferred to all recipients simultaneously. On the contrary, using
unicast method the message is sent to exactly one destination device. However, it has a relatively
lower probability of finding global optima. 37.5 % of the reviewed protocols broadcast FANTs
and another 37.5 % prefer unicasting them. It is also noteworthy that the remaining protocols,
namely AntHocNet [54] and ACO-AHR [57], switch between unicast and broadcast type, based
on whether there is any routing information about destination nodes. A less common way of
updating pheromone values is presented in ARA [52] and Ant-E [61] where data packets update
the pheromone and in ACO-AHR [57], where service agents take over this duty.
After having an overview of the common design properties, the properties of the pheromone ap-
plied in these ACO-based routing protocols are introduced. Table 2.2 includes some representative
ACO algorithm related parameters: design goals, ant types, the pheromone reinforcement factor(s)
and the pheromone evaporation factor(s). The basic optimization routing protocols in Table 2.2 aim
to efficiently find optimal routes with limited routing overhead. Most of the studied protocols use
two kinds of ants, FANTs and BANTs. Due to different requirements in the reactive and proactive
routing phases, many hybrid protocols use more than two types of ants. For example, in HOP-
NET [58]. The way in which pheromone values are calculated differs among the listed protocols.
The metrics used for reinforcing the pheromone are usually hop count, ant’s travel time, end to
end delay and path goodness. Most of the protocols consider a combination of these metrics with
separate weights, according to the requirements of the corresponding protocol. The pheromone
evaporation process is based on evaporation factors which can be dynamic or static. The common
evaporation factor is a predefined constant rate. One example of the dynamic evaporation factor is
the goodness of trip time factor used in AntNet [51].
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Table 2.3: Design parameter overview of QoS aware ACO-based routing protocols
Protocol Routing Approach Tran. Type FANT Ph. Activator
ARAMA [63] proactive unicast BANTs
SAMP-DSR [64] hybrid unicast RREQs
QAMR [65] reactive broadcast BANTs, FANTs
QoRA [66] reactive broadcast BANTs
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Table 2.4: Pheromone parameter overview of QoS aware ACO-based routing protocols
Protocol Design Goals Ant Types Pheromone
Reinforcement Evaporation
ARAMA [63]
Optimize hop counts
and QoS,
energy efficient
FANT,
BANT
queue delay,
remaining battery energy,
link’s signal to noise ratio,
bit error, path grade
path grade
SAMP-DSR [64]
Solve the shortcoming
of ACO and DSR
FANT,
RREQ
end to end reliability,
the trip time unknown
QAMR [65] Achieve link stability
FANT,
BANT
bandwidth, delay,
hop count constant
QoRA [66]
less further
control messages or
without synchronization
FANT,
BANT,
EANT
constant constant
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Comparison of QoS aware ACO-based routing protocols
Quality of Service is the primary mission for data transmission and communication in MANETs.
Table 2.3 presents the basic properties of the selected four QoS aware ACO-based routing protocols.
Similar to the result from Table 2.1, 75 % of the studied protocols in this section have designed
the protocol with a reactive or hybrid structure. ARAMA [63] as an early protocol is a proactive
approach and SAMP-DSR [64] is a hybrid protocol. The recent protocols prefer to use reactive
approaches such as QAMR [65] and QoRA [66], because they adapt better to real-time communi-
cations. The rest of table shows that half of the protocols broadcast FANTs while the other half
unicast them. Only QAMR uses both FANTs and BANTs to update the pheromone while the
others use just BANTs or RREQs, which are Route REQuest packets.
As shown in table 2.4, all the surveyed protocols aim mainly to ensure link stability and optimize
hop count. QoRA attempts to reduce overhead produced by control messages or without synchro-
nization. Parameters related to QoS such as delay, remaining battery energy, end to end reliability
and bandwidth are considered as pheromone reinforcement factors in these protocols. Most of
the reviewed protocols in this subsection use a constant rate to evaporate the pheromone except
ARAMA which estimates the path grade and uses it as an evaporation factor.
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Table 2.5: Design parameter overview of energy aware ACO-based routing protocols
Protocol Routing Approach Tran. Type FANT Ph. Activator
ACO-EEAODR [69] reactive broadcast RREPs
EAAR [70] reactive broadcast BANTs
AntHocMMP [71] proactive unicast FANTs, BANTs
ACECR [72] proactive broadcast BANTs
Hybrid ACO [74] reactive unicast FANTs
© 2017 IEEE
Table 2.6: Pheromone parameter overview of energy aware ACO-based routing protocols
Protocol Design Goals Ant Types Pheromone
Reinforcement Evaporation
ACO-EEAODR [69]
increase
network lifetime
Route REQuest (RREQ),
Route REPly (RREP)
remaining
battery power unknown
EAAR [70]
less energy consumption,
multi-path transmission
FANT,
BANT
MBR,
hop count constant rate
AntHocMMP [71]
path robustness,
extend network lifetime
FANT,
BANT energy path cost constant rate
ACECR [72]
extend
network lifetime
FANT,
BANT
avg. & min.
energy, hop count constant rate
Hybrid ACO [74]
secure,
energy efficiency FANT predefined constant constant rate
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Comparison of energy aware ACO-based routing protocols
The limited battery power of nodes in ad hoc networks is one critical issue. Repeatedly using the
shortest path will drain the battery of the nodes on it and decrease the lifetime of the network as
a whole. For this reason energy efficiency has become a hot issue in designing routing protocols
rather than being just one of many QoS requirements. Table 2.5 and 2.6 present the details of the
comparison in this area.
Table 2.5 shows that only 40 % of the protocols set up routes proactively. While BANTs are usually
unicast from the destination back to the source, FANTs are either broadcast or unicasted hop
by hop. 60 % of the reviewed protocols in this subsection update pheromone after ants have
reached their destinations. The concrete pheromone update activators in these protocols are either
BANTs or RREPs. Besides BANTs, AntHocMMP [71] also uses FANTs to update pheromone
values. Hybrid ACO doesn’t specify the type of ants it uses. Pheromone updates occur before ants
have reached the destination nodes. Therefore, it’s similar to the protocols which use FANTs as
the pheromone update activators. Table 2.6 shows that the main purpose of all energy efficient
protocols is to extend the whole network’s lifetime by reducing repetitive use of the same nodes
in shortest paths. For pheromone reinforcement, Hybrid ACO just uses a predefined constant
amount, while ACO-EEAODR [69] considers only the remaining battery power for updating
pheromone values. ACECR [72] considers both the average energy and minimum energy of a path
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Table 2.7: Design parameter overview of location aware ACO-based routing protocols
Protocol Routing Approach Tran. Type FANT Ph. Activator
POSANT [77] reactive unicast BANTs
Robustness-ACO [78] hybrid broadcast FANTs,BANTs
MAR-DYMO [79] reactive broadcast RREPs
MAZACORNET [82] hybrid unicast unknown
Cluster-based ACO [85] reactive broadcast RREPs
S-AMCQ [86] reactive unicast or broadcast RQANTs
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Table 2.8: Pheromone parameter overview of location aware ACO-based routing protocols
Protocol Design Goals Ant Types Pheromone
Reinforcement Evaporation
POSANT [77] Min. delivery delay FANT,BANT distance,location constant rate
Robustness-
ACO [78] construct robust paths
Hybrid FANT/
BANT robustness,cost constant rate
MAR-DYMO [79]
adapt ACO to
VANETs
Hello message,
RREQ/RREP
reception probability,
lifetime ratio path lifetime
MAZA-
CORNET [82]
scalability,robust
to link failures
Internal Forward ANT (IFANT),EFANT,
BANT,Notification ANT (NANT),
EANT
same with
MAR-DYMO
same with
MAR-DYMO
Cluster-based
ACO [85]
improve MAC layer
efficiency
Hello message,
RREQ/RREP
same with
MAR-DYMO
same with
MAR-DYMO
S-AMCQ [86]
ensure reliable,
robust routing
RQANT,RPANT
REANT
QoS metrics,
reliability value
individual
variable
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to select a path with more residual energy on a global view. Both EAAR [70] and AntHocMMP
consider the Maximum of MRB of all nodes in a path. The difference between them is that EAAR
uses MRB as a pheromone reinforce factor while AntHocMMP uses it to find relative paths.
Comparison of location based ACO-based routing protocols
In this subsection, the different parameters for the location aware ACO routing protocols are
presented in table 2.7 and 2.8.
Table 2.7 shows that all the reviewed protocols avoid to apply the proactive approach, due to
the overhead caused by proactively maintaining of routing tables. As for the transmission type
of FANTs, ca. 50 % of all approaches broadcast FANTs while the remaining protocols except
S-AMCQ, unicast FANTs. S-AMCQ broadcasts the routing control ants only when there is insuf-
ficient information available at the pheromone table. In the pheromone update phase, only in
the Robustness-ACO protocol both FANTs and BANTs can update the pheromone. Utilizing the
location information from GPS helps ACO-based routing protocols adapt better to MANETs, espe-
cially to VANETs. The main goals of many reviewed protocols in this subsection are to minimize
delivery delay and establish robust routes. Various ant types are used in these approaches. Other
than the basic FANTs and BANTs, there are IFANTs, External Forward ANT (EFANT)s, NANTs
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Table 2.9: Design parameter overview of security aware ACO-based routing protocols
Protocol Routing Approach Tran. Type FANT Ph. Activator
SAR-ECC [87] reactive unicast unknown
SPA-ARA [89] reactive both BANTs
FTAR [96] reactive broadcast FANTs
SBDT [97] reactive unknown unknown
DBA-ACO [98] reactive unknown unknown
ANTNET [99] reactive unknown ANTs
ABPKM [100] reactive unicast BANTs
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Table 2.10: Pheromone parameter overview of security aware ACO-based routing protocols
Protocol Design Goals Ant Types Pheromone
Reinforcement Evaporation
SAR-ECC [87] secure routing FANT, BANT trust value unknown
SPA-ARA [89]
energy efficiency,
detect malicious nodes FANT, BANT
distance,
traveling time constant rate
FTAR [96] trusted routing FANT, BANT constant rate constant rate
SBDT [97] detect malicious nodes FANT, BANT unknown unknown
DBA-ACO [98]
detect and prevent
black hole attack FANT, BANT unknown unknown
ANTNET [99]
detect and prevent
black hole attack ANT
trails,
attractiveness unknown
ABPKM [100]
secure self-organized
authentication routing
FANT, BANT,
RANT, UANT trust value constant rate
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and EANTs in protocols which are designed for hierarchical networks, such as MAZACORNET.
In some of the reviewed protocols, RREQs and RREPs are also used in the route discovery phase.
Hop count and the cost of a route are two main pheromone reinforce factors in MANETs. In
VANETs, however, this can be quite different due to frequent interruptions of paths. [79], [82], [85]
in the VANETs scope use the probability of reception of a message, the ratio between the estimated
lifetime of a path and the maximum allowed lifetime of a path, to update the pheromone. The
protocols in MANETs use a constant rate for pheromone evaporation, while the VANETs protocols
use the lifetime of a path or an individual variable value [86] to reduce the pheromone values.
Comparison of security aware ACO-based routing protocols
Due to the prevalence of security threats in the networks, security is also a hot topic that attracts
many researchers’ attention. Common attack types are, for example, black hole and wormhole
attacks. Different researchers have proposed various ideas about how to ensure security in their
routing protocols. In this section, a selection of security aware ACO-based routing protocols are
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compared. These protocols use several methods to ensure secure routing. Table 2.9 shows that all
surveyed protocols in this subsection use reactive approaches, thus avoiding the higher overhead
commonly associated with proactive methods. For example, besides the regular proactive routing
table maintenance, if a malicious node is detected in proactive approaches, all nodes in the network
need to put the malicious node into black lists and update their routing tables to avoid routes
including the reported malicious node. Table 2.10 shows that most of the security aware ACO
routing protocols aim to ensure finding secure and reliable routes. Some of them such as DBA-
ACO [98] and ANTNET [99] focus on defending against certain attack types, while others are
interested in detecting malicious or anomalous nodes in the network. All the listed protocols use
the basic ant types, except ABPKM [100] which has two other special ant types, namely Repair
ANT (RANT)s and Update ANT (UANT)s. Although some of the proposed protocols have not
described their pheromone related parameters clearly, it still can be found that there are various
pheromone reinforcement factors, which are applied in this subsection. Besides a trust value,
which is the most common parameter, there are also other parameters used for reinforcing the
pheromone values, such as traveling time, distance, trails and attractiveness. In contrast to the
reinforcement factors, most of the protocols use a constant rate to evaporate the pheromone over
time.
2.2.5 Simulation parameter comparison of ACO-based routing protocols
Comparison of implementation related metrics
Table 2.11 shows the representative performance metrics of the surveyed protocols in the five
main categories. As can be seen in table 2.11, nearly 97 % of the surveyed protocols have im-
plemented their ideas and evaluated their performance of these, ca. 83 % are implemented in
common simulators, such as NS-2 [84], GloMoSim [59]/ QualNet [55], OMNet++ [104] and so
on. Around 10 % protocols are implemented in self-developed simulators. Around 83 % of the
studied protocols have compared their performance to that of other standard routing protocols
for MANETs. AODV [8] is one of the most popular protocols chosen for comparison in earlier
publications. After being presented to the public, AntHocNet [54] also becomes a benchmark ACO
routing protocol commonly used for comparison.
In order to evaluate the performance, researchers mainly focus on Data Delivery Ratio (DDR), the
end to end delay and the routing overhead. 80 % of the studied protocols have shown results for at
least one of these three metrics. Moreover, nearly 79 % of the protocols in the basic and location
aware ACO routing categories have evaluated all these three metrics. In the location aware ACO
routing category this value even rises to 100 %. Meanwhile, the percentage of protocols which don’t
consider any special performance metrics in these two categories are 50 % and 40 % respectively.
In the other three categories these values are much lower. This indicates that basic and location
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Table 2.11: Simulation parameter overview of ACO-based routing protocols
Protocol Compare with Simulator DDR Delay Overhead Special
B
as
ic
AntNet [51]
OSPF,SPF,BF,
Q-R,PQ-R,
Daemon
own simulator [51] NO YES YES YES
ARA [52]
AODV,
DSDV,DSR NS-2 [84] YES NO YES NO
PERA [53] AODV NS-2 NO YES NO YES
AntHocNet [54] AODV QualNet [55] YES YES YES YES
PACONET [56] AODV GloMoSim [59] YES YES YES NO
ACO-AHR [57] AODV NS-2 YES YES YES NO
HOPENT [58]
AODV,ZRP,
AntHocNet GloMoSim YES YES YES YES
Ant-E [61]
AODV,ZRP,
AntHocNet NS-2 YES YES YES NO
Q
oS
aw
ar
e
ARAMA [63] without OPNET [103] YES NO NO YES
SAMP-DSR [64]
EMP-DSR,MP-DSR,
AODV,AntHocNet OMNet++ [104] YES YES YES NO
QAMR [65]
AODV,
ARMAN NS-2 YES NO YES YES
QoRA [66]
AODV,
CLWPR NS-3 [105] YES YES NO YES
En
er
gy
aw
ar
e
ACO-
EEAODR [69] EEAODR GloMoSim NO NO NO YES
EAAR [70]
AODV,MMBCR,
AntHocNet GloMoSim NO NO NO YES
AntHocMMP [71]
AntHocNet,LAR,
R-ACO1,MMP NS-2 YES YES YES YES
ACECR [72] AOMDA, EAAR NS-2 YES YES NO YES
Hybrid ACO [74] Normal ACO unknown NO YES NO YES
Lo
ca
ti
on
aw
ar
e
POSANT [77]
AntNet, GPSR,
AntHocNet own simulator [77] YES YES YES NO
Robustness-
ACO [78] AntHocNet, LAR own simulator [78] YES YES YES YES
MAR-
DYMO [79]
AODV,DYMO,
Ant-DYMO
NS-2,
VNMG [83] YES YES YES NO
MAZA-
CORNET [82]
AODV,AMODV,
GPSR
NS-2,
VanetMobiSim [106] YES YES YES YES
Cluster-based
ACO [85] AODV NS-2,VNMG YES YES YES YES
S-AMCQ [86] IAQR [107],AMCQ [86] OMNet++ YES YES NO YES
Se
cu
ri
ty
aw
ar
e SAR-ECC [87] without NS-2 NO NO NO YES
SPA-ARA [89] AODV,DSR,ARA SWANS [108] NO NO NO YES
FTAR [96] ANT-U NS-2 YES YES YES YES
SBDT [97] CAPMAN NS-2 YES YES NO YES
DBA-ACO [98] without NO NO NO NO NO
ANTNET [99] without NS-2 NO NO NO YES
ABPKM [100] without QualNet YES YES YES YES
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aware ACO routing protocols consider these three metrics as important performance metrics.
In contrast, the other three categories have more special performance metrics due to their design
aims. Besides the previously mentioned metrics, data throughput, the scalability of the network
and the hop counts of connections are the most popular metrics used by many protocols from all
the five main categories. Moreover, there are some other particular special metrics for different
categories due to their special pertinence. For example, in the energy aware ACO routing category,
ACO-EEAODR [69] and EAAR [70] have not illustrated any common metrics. ACO-EEAODR
only compared the energy consumed in path selection and the network lifetime. EAAR uses six
performance metrics for the comparison of their protocols with others, which are the number of
dead nodes, the number of packets dropped, the total energy consumed, the number of packets
delivered, the energy per packet delivered, the packets delivered per dead node and the packets
dropped per packets delivered. The network lifetime, the dead node ratio and the energy consumed
are the most popular performance metrics for all surveyed protocols in this category.
In the security aware ACO routing category there are also many special metrics. Except for DBA-
ACO [98], which has no implementation, all of the other protocols in this category are evaluated
using special metrics. Moreover, 50 % of these protocols have only focused on evaluation using
their own special performance metrics. For instance, in SBDT [97], the authors have shown the
detection accuracy which represents how well the algorithm detects security threats. In SAR-
ECC [87] the authors have presented the successful rate of packet forwarding, the authentication
cost and the necessary packet rate vs. the speed of nodes. Another protocol SPA-ARA [89] also
shows the energy consumption, the number of successfully found routes and the number of packets
dropped by the malicious nodes. From observations, it indicates that security aware ACO routing
protocols consider the security related metrics more important than the general benchmarking
metrics, such as end to end delay. In other words, in order to guarantee security during network
communication, these protocols made a trade-off between the security level and performance.
However, due to the different scope aimed at by these protocols targeting various security issues,
there are not many common special performance metrics. This could be a reason to answer the
question why 50 % of protocols in this category have not made any comparison with related work.
Another observation shows that although many of the surveyed protocols have shown good
performance in small networks, the scalability of the proposed protocols has not been demonstrated.
In contrast, in [96] the authors have shown the DDR, delay and overhead metrics over increasing
the network sizes and mobility rates respectively. Besides the common performance metrics related
to the scalability, in [100] the authors have also shown the successful rate of finding certificate
chain, the reliability of selected honest certificate chains and other special metrics which describe
the performance of the proposed approach.
From the reviewed ACO-based routing protocols in this paper, it can be clearly seen that significant
efforts have been made to address the requirements of efficient and effective routing protocols for
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(a) The development. (b) The proportion.
Figure 2.4: ACO-based routing protocols in MANETs.
MANETs. The results of the comparison based on protocol design and simulation parameters are
presented in section 2.2.4 and 2.2.5. Certain drawbacks in the considered routing protocols are
also identified. First of all, most of the reviewed approaches in all five categories have not been
evaluated with large networks. Although all the surveyed protocols have shown good performance
in small networks, the scalability of the proposed protocols has not been demonstrated. Secondly,
most of the location aware protocols have not mentioned security or authentication and all the
proposed protocols in VANETs completely lack practical testing via real-time traffic models. Finally,
in the security based ACO routing category, more than 50 % of the protocols only do self analysis
and no comparison with other standard routing protocols are done.
Discussion
In this section the development history of the five main categories is summarized and future
possible design directions of ACO-based routing protocols are also discussed.
Figure 2.4a shows the development history of all surveyed papers of the five main categories in the
past 19 years. Designing effective and efficient protocols to address only the basic requirements
of routing in MANETs used to be a hot topic. Due to the dynamic nature of ACO’s connectivity,
ACO is able to continuously find the optimal routes in real time despite the topology changes in
the network. Therefore, researchers began to apply ACO algorithm to solve the routing problem
in MANETs. The first ACO-based routing protocol was proposed in 1998. Since then many
subsequent researchers have focused on this direction for more than ten years. In the early
blossoming stage of ACO-based routing algorithms, QoS in routing was an important aspect in
MANETs and until now QoS aware ACO-based routing protocols have been studied for over than
13 years. The other three categories shown in figure 2.4a are relatively new directions which have
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been developed within the last ten years.
Figure 2.4b illustrates the number of proposed ACO routing papers during different periods in
time. Before 2005 there were only few proposed protocols, therefore they are summarized in one
time span. From 2005 on, the number of papers over four year periods is shown for each category.
It can be seen that most of the publications are focused on basic ACO-based protocols in MANETs
before 2008. After 2010 there is no further study in this category. Since 2007 the three new research
directions of energy aware, location aware and security aware ACO-based routing protocols have
attracted more and more researchers. Therefore, designing routing protocols which aim only for
finding the optimal routes was no longer the focus of this research area. While in the period from
2005 to 2008 there was no new QoS aware ACO-based routing protocol, this field continues to be
actively studied up to now. QoS will always need to be improved as it remains a priority to satisfy
users’ communication requirements. In recent years, energy efficiency is becoming an independent
and significant issue in designing ACO-based routing protocols. In figure 2.4b the number of
energy aware ACO-based protocols rises up significantly after 2009, from 10 % of all protocols in
the third time slot to 36 % in the fourth time slot. However, some of the energy aware protocols
make trade-offs with respect to path length or route delay. Further research in this area is still
necessary to resolve these open issues.
During the last ten years, location information aware vehicle routing is becoming a hot topic, due
to the increasing ubiquity of GPS. Location information aware routing protocols have been widely
used, especially in VANETs. From the reviewed ACO-based routing protocols in VANETs, most
of the protocols are designed for Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) networks. As the V2I communication
networks develop progressively, in the future new protocols will be proposed in this area. Moreover,
since most of the reviewed protocols do not consider any security issues, designing security and
location aware ACO-based routing protocols in MANETs, would be an interesting future research
direction. S-AMCQ [86] is a good example. At the same time, security aware protocols themselves
are also a growing field. The proportion of this category remains stable. New protocols in this
category are needed to reduce overhead and delay introduced by the security mechanisms, such as
authentication processes. Moreover, combining security and other metrics would be valuable. For
example, security and energy aware ACO-based routing protocols that avoid repeated usage of the
optimal secure path could be designed and studied. Combining security and location aware ACO
routing protocols for usage in VANETs also seems promising. All in all, designing QoS, energy,
location and security aware ACO-based routing protocol are four main research directions. There
are still open questions in each direction which encourage researchers to study further. However,
considering multiple issues in the design of a routing protocol can make the protocol more suitable
for real world applications. Therefore, designing ACO routing protocols based on the multiple
existing issues in MANETs and especially in VANETs, would be an interesting future research
direction.
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2.2.6 Summary
Due to the self-organizing properties of MANETs, routing is considered a challenging problem.
The ACO meta-heuristic which presents a common framework for approximating solutions to
NP-hard optimization problems is especially applicable to dynamic problems, such as routing
in MANETs. In the past two decades, researchers have designed various ACO-based routing
protocols in MANETs. Section 2.2.2 introduces mainly the ACO algorithm and the existing ACO-
based routing protocols in MANETs from 1998 up to now. The reviewed protocols are sorted
into five main categories and a detailed comparative analysis in terms of protocol design and
simulation related parameters for all reviewed protocols is presented. Besides the reviews and
comparisons, the open issues of the surveyed protocols are also discussed. Finally, based on the
observations, the changes in research interests over the years are summarized and the promising
future directions for research in ACO-based routing protocols are also discussed.
2.3 Security attacks in MANETs
Due to the wireless properties, nodes in MANETs are vulnerable to network attacks. This section
will introduce the general classification of security attacks in MANETs and also presents some of
the well-known attacks, specially the attacks that target the network layer.
2.3.1 Classification of attacks in MANETs
As introduced in section 2.1.1, MANETs have special properties which are different from the
wired networks. However, these special properties lead to many general security vulnerabilities.
First, MANETs are infrastructure-less networks and there is no central trusted authority, which
can take care of the security threats for the whole network. Therefore, security solutions must
adapt to the distributed architecture of MANETs. Secondly, nodes in MANETs are free to move
in the whole network area and they can leave and join the network at any time. The high
flexibility of nodes movement leads to the frequent topology changes in MANETs. Therefore, it
is more difficult to recognize the selfish or malicious behaviors of nodes in the network. Thirdly,
bandwidth in MANETs is restricted and due to the nature of the shared wireless transmission
channel, adversaries can launch interference to make congestions or monitor the network traffic.
Furthermore, ad hoc nodes usually have limited battery power and restricted data storage capacity
and computational power. However, security solutions usually require more resources, due to
cryptography operations or other security related operations. Therefore, achieving security in
MANETs is more challenging as that in wired networks. Finally, the physical protection of mobile
ad hoc nodes is usually not very strong. In hostile environments, mobile nodes are likely be
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damaged or compromised by attackers and used for launching an internal attack which is hard to
be defended.
There exist many security attacks for MANETs and according to the attack means, these attacks
can be generally categorized into two groups, namely passive attacks and active attacks [109].
Passive attacks
This type of attacks is launched by attackers who want to hide their presence from the network.
Therefore, passive attacks do not interrupt any network functionalities, but they aim for collecting
valuable information, such as the identity of the important nodes in the network or the location of
nodes, through monitoring and analyzing the network traffic.
An example of passive attacks is the eavesdropping attack [110]. Since a packet sent by a node can
be heard by all its neighbor nodes which are equipped a transceiver, if the packet is not encrypted
at all, then attackers can easily get valuable information from the network traffic. Furthermore,
the sender and receiver are hardly able to notice that their packets are eavesdropped. Defending
against passive attacks is very difficult since there is no direct evidence to reveal the existence of
such attacks. The recommended countermeasure is to apply powerful encryption techniques.
Active attacks
In active attacks adversaries launch intrusive operations such as modifying, fabricating, injecting,
forging or dropping packets, thereby leading to disruptions of the network communication.
The effect made by active attacks can be so severe that the network performance is degraded
significantly. In the worst case, attackers can even bring down the entire network. There are
many types of active attacks. Base on where the attacks take place regarding to the Open Systems
Interconnection model (OSI model) [111] layer, attacks can be further divided into Medium Access
Control layer (MAC layer) attacks, network layer attacks, transport layer attacks, application layer
attacks and the others.
2.3.2 Security attacks in MANETs based on OSI model
Some of the well-known attacks in MANETs is presented in table 2.12 based on OSI model layers.
Table 2.12: Security attacks in MANETs based on OSI model
OSI model layer Security attacks
MAC layer jamming, GTS, etc.
Network layer black hole, flooding, etc.
Transport layer session hijacking, etc.
Application layer repudiation, etc.
Others DoS, etc.
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MAC layer attacks
MAC layer attacks aim for disturbing the availability of the Mac layer, such as the jamming
attacks [112]. Since the wireless channel is shared with every participants in the network, attackers
are able to launch different kinds of interference to jam the frequency channels which leads to the
deny of services for legal users in the network. A jammer can interfere with legitimate wireless
communications either by preventing a node from sending out packets, or by preventing the
reception of packets by the node. Another example in this type of attacks is the Guaranteed Time
Slot (GTS) attack [113]. A malicious node in a GTS attack can extract the GTS descriptor within
beacon frame and analyze the GTS times of the coordinator. Whenever it obtains the allocated GTS
times, the malicious node is able to create interference which causes collision of the data packets
between the normal node and the coordinator node.
Network layer attacks
Since the routing protocols can establish and facilitate the connections among wireless devices
in MANETs, they are the foundation of MANET applications. However, due to the absence
of infrastructure and the shared wireless communication channel, nodes in MANETs are very
susceptible to attacks and the traditional security mechanisms applied in the wired networks are
not suitable for MANETs. Various types of network layer attacks are exposed and studied by
researchers. Some of well-known network layer attacks are introduced as below:
Black hole attacks [114]: As soon as receiving a route request packet, a black hole node advertises
itself as having the shortest path to the destination node. As most protocols prefer to use the
shortest path for data transmission, the black hole node are likely be chosen in the route. Therefore
it can then drop data packets or perform message modification attacks.
Gray hole attacks [115]: Gray hole attacks can be considered as a variant of black hole attacks. In
stead of dropping data packets constantly, the gray hole node can switch its states between normal
and malicious behavior. In the route discovery phase, it may behave normally, but it may drop
data packets in the data forwarding phase. As normal nodes might drop packets due to congestion,
the detection of a gray hole node is not easy.
Wormhole attacks [116]: This type of attacks is launched by at least two colluding attackers. The
attackers connect with each other through a long-range wireless link or even through a wired
link. Once an attacker receives packets at one position in the network, it tunnels them to the other
attacker which is located at another position in the network, and the other attacker then replays
these packets into the network at that new position.
Flooding attacks [117]: Flooding attack in network layer is a type of resource consumption attacks
which try to waste away resources of normal nodes in the network, such as battery power, band-
width, and computational power. Flooding nodes in this attack usually broadcast fake routing
packets, such as the route request packets. Other nodes in the network have to forward these
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routing packets and consume their recourses.
Transport layer attacks
Session hijacking attack [118] can be launched by using off-the-shelf hardware and software. It
can combine with Denial of Service (DoS) and identity spoofing attacks. For example, in a session
hijacking attack the adversary disrupts a ongoing session by forcing a legitimate mobile station to
terminate its connection to an access point first. Then the adversary can masquerade itself with the
MAC layer address of the disconnected mobile station and associate with the access point.
Application layer attacks
In a repudiation attack [119], the attacker accesses the network, but denies completely or partly of
the participation in the network communications.
Other attacks
Besides these attacks which are launched in a single OSI model layer, there are also attacks which
are usually launched through multiple OSI model layers, such as DoS attacks [120]. Attackers in
DoS attacks aim to deny network services to legitimate nodes. According to the targeted type of
service, DoS attacks can be launched in different OSI model layers. For example, if the attacker
aims to deny the network service, then it can launch the flooding attacks by broadcasting fake route
request packets which is targeted to a non-existing node in the network. These fake control packets
are flooded in the network and the normal service in network layer is disturbed. Another example
is the session hijacking attacks in the transport layer. Since the attacker in a session hijacking attack
can control a ongoing session, it can cause the denial of service for the legitimate nodes in the
session.
2.4 Attack Models
After introducing the overview of the existing network layer attacks in MANETs, the attack models
[121], [122] implemented in the experiments are introduced in this section.
2.4.1 Black hole attack
Since packet-dropping attacks are a major threat to the security of MANETs [23], in this work
the black hole attack introduced in [114] is chosen as one of the attack models to investigate
SAFEACO’s performance.
As shown in figure 2.5, node M is a black hole node. When the source node S attempts to find
a route to destination node D, S sends out FANTs to discover the network. As soon as node M
receives the FANT, it replies immediately with a BANT which contains a fake route. This fake
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Figure 2.5: Black hole attack model.
route will designate itself as the shortest or optimal route. If the source node does not have any
mechanism to detect malicious behavior, it will be deceived and will send all data packets to the
black hole node, which simply drops them.
2.4.2 Sybil attack
Figure 2.6: Sybil attack model.
In 2002 J. R. Douceur first introduced the Sybil attack [123] in context of peer-to-peer networks. In
the Sybil attack, a malicious node presents multiple identities to the other nodes in the network.
C. Karlof and D. Wagner pointed out that the Sybil attack can threaten the routing mechanism in
wireless sensor networks [124]. J. Newsome et al. established a classification of different kinds
of the Sybil attack in [125]. According to this classification, Sybil attacks can be divided into
simultaneous and Non-Simultaneous attacks. In the first group, a Sybil node may try to present all
its Sybil identities to the network in the same time. Since a particular hardware entity can only
show one identity at a time, it can cycle through all its identities to let other nodes believe that all
the identities are a group of nodes which exist simultaneously in the network [125]. In the other
group, a Sybil node can let one or a group of its Sybil identities leave or join the network at any
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given time [125].
In this work, a special case of the non-simultaneous Sybil attack is implemented. A Sybil node has
multiple (at least two) Sybil identities. Every Sybil identity is not duplicated with any other nodes’
identity in the network. Sybil node presents only one of its identities to the network at a time, but
it switches its identity in a predefined interval, for example, in every 50 seconds. However, if the
Sybil node only switches its identities in the routing process, it does not affect much the routing
performance. In order to better understand the effects made by the Sybil attack, the black hole
attack is embedded into the Sybil attack in the way that each Sybil identity can launch the black
hole attack. Figure 2.6 shows that a Sybil node M with two extra hidden identities in the network.
In the experiments, node M has three identities: M1, M2 and M3. In every 50 seconds, node M
switches its identities and it uses the current identity to launch the black hole attack until the next
switch moment.
2.4.3 Flooding attack
Figure 2.7: Flooding attack model.
The main target of the flooding attack [117] is to consume network resources, such as bandwidth, to
exhaust the energy available to nodes energy or their computational power, to disrupt the routing
process in the network. This kind of attack doesn’t aim at the resources of some particular nodes,
but the resources of the whole network. In this attack mode, a flooding node broadcasts excessive
RREQ packets with non-existing destination Internet Protocol (IP) addresses. In this case, no one
in the network could reply the these RREQs and as consequence the network will be full of such
fake RREQs.
In this work, instead of RREQ packets the flooding nodes regularly broadcast fake FANTs which
include a non-existing IP address as the destination node. Since normal nodes can not directly
notice that the destination IP address doesn’t exist in the network, they will forward the fake FANT
to their neighbor nodes. In order to make the flooding nodes more difficult to be detected, the
attack node is set to flood the fake FANTs every three seconds in the implementation.

Chapter 3
SAFEACO in MANETs
Inspired by other ACO routing algorithms, a security aware fuzzy enhanced ant colony optimiza-
tion routing protocol in MANETs is proposed. The aim is to design a routing protocol in MANETs
which can provide a high packet delivery ratio, low end-to-end delay and low communication
overhead in normal scenarios as well as in attack scenarios. Therefore, SAFEACO has to guarantee
both efficiency and security as a routing protocol for MANETs. The primal ideas of SAFEACO
routing protocol have been introduced mainly in [121, 122, 126].
Since AntHocNet [127], with its hybrid architecture, shows convincing performance and it has
been proven to be more efficient than other state-of-the-art routing protocols in MANETs, such as
AODV, its routing structure is applied in SAFEACO. Therefore, there are four similar processes in
SAFEACO as those designed in AntHocNet, namely the reactive route discovery, the proactive
route maintenance, the data transmission and the handling of link failures.
Figure 3.1: General routing structure of SAFEACO.
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Section 3.1 presents the reactive route discovery in SAFEACO, while section 3.2 introduces the
proactive route maintenance in SAFEACO. The data transmission process is introduced in sec-
tion 3.3 and section 3.4 presents the handling of link failures in SAFEACO. Figure 3.1 gives an
overview of the general routing structure of SAFEACO.
3.1 Reactive Route Setup in SAFEACO
Figure 3.2: SAFEACO in a MANET.
In order to apply the ACO algorithm to the problem of routing in MANETs, the network has to be
represented as a graph [49]. Figure 3.2 shows an example, where an optimal route between the
nodes S and D should be found. Ants can only travel along the edges of the graph, which represent
the communication links between the nodes participating in the network.
Figure 3.3 introduces the flowchart of the reactive route setup process. To find a route, node S
broadcasts reactive FANTs. The probability for a reactive FANT which starts from node i to choose
node j as the next hop is defined as in equation 3.1 [121, 122, 126].
P dij(t) = [τdij(t) ⋅Rij(t)]α∑l∈Ndi [τdil(t) ⋅Ril(t)]α ,∀j ∈ Ndi (3.1)
In this equation, P dij(t) is the probability of an ant moving from node i to node j on the way to
the destination node d at the t-th iteration step or time slot; Ndi is the set of current neighboring
nodes of node i, over which a route to node d is known; τdij(t) is the regular pheromone intensity
on the link between nodes i and j on the way to destination node d at t-th iteration step or time
slot; Rij(t) is the reliability value estimated by the fuzzy detection system in section 3.5 for the link
between nodes i and j at the t-th iteration step or time slot; α ⩾ 1, is a parameter which controls the
exploratory behavior of the ants. α is set to 20 in the experiments, which is the same value used in
AntHocNet [127].
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Figure 3.3: The flowchart of the reactive route setup process.
As shown in figure 3.3, the reactive FANT is either unicast or broadcast at each intermediate node,
depending on whether the current node has routing information for the destination. In order to
limit the overhead caused by broadcasting ants, intermediate nodes only forward the first copy
of any received ants. A reactive FANT moves hop by hop until it reaches the destination node
or until the maximum travel hop count of the ant is reached. For each step, it chooses one of its
neighbor nodes according to equation 3.1.
After the ant arrives at the destination node, it turns into a BANT and travels back to the source
node by following exactly the same route. At each intermediate node, the BANT updates the cost
value Cid by adding the last hop’s cost value Cin to it. Cid represents the cost of sending a packet
from node i to node d along this route. The amount of pheromone updates assigned to a link is
calculated based on the quality of the route in which this link is involved, and the pheromone
evaporation rate, as shown in equation 3.2 [127]. An ant considers the quality of a route to be an
amount that is inversely proportional to the cost of the route Cid. The pheromone evaporation rate
is predefined and allows ants to forget outdated routes and to explore new routes.
τnewij = ρ ⋅ τoldij + (1 − ρ) ⋅ 1Cid (3.2)
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τoldij is the previous regular pheromone value on the link between nodes i and j; τ
new
ij is the updated
regular pheromone value on the link between nodes i and j; ρ ∈ (0,1] is the pheromone evaporation
rate. In the experiments, ρ is set to 0.7, which is same as in AntHocNet [127].
Since Cid is the total cost of sending a packet from node i to node d along this route, let node
a and node b be the arbitrary adjacent two nodes in this route and let Cab represent the cost of
sending a packet toward node d from node a to node b. Cab is calculated based on Signal-to-Noise
Ratio (SNR) as shown in equation 3.3 [127].
Cab = ⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
1 if SNR > SNRt
Cconst if SNR ⩽ SNRt (3.3)
SNRt is the predefined threshold value of for the SNR, at which a link is considered to be bad;
Cconst is the cost of using a bad link. In the experiments, SNRt is set to 17 dB and Cconst is set to 3,
which are the same values used in the original AntHocNet implementation [127].
After the route to the destination is discovered successfully, data packets are ready for transmission.
This process is introduced in section 3.3.
3.2 Proactive Route Maintenance in SAFEACO
In order to improve routing efficiency, a proactive route maintenance mechanism which consists of
pheromone diffusion and proactive ant sampling is also proposed in SAFEACO.
3.2.1 Pheromone Diffusion
In this process, node i, chooses randomly up to 10 destinations to which it has valid routing
information. It creates a list of these destinations, their corresponding best pheromone values
and a flag that shows whether the best pheromone is a regular pheromone value or a virtual
(or bootstrapped) pheromone value for the route. Node i adds this list to its hello message and
broadcasts it regularly to all neighbor nodes. After receiving a hello message from node i, the
neighbor node j, checks the routing information in the hello message. For each reported destination
node in the list, node j estimates separately a bootstrapped pheromone value from itself to this
destination node d. The exact formula is given in equation 3.4 [127].
Kdji = ((V di )−1 +Cij)−1 (3.4)
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In the equation, Kdji denotes the bootstrapped pheromone value of node j to destination d via
neighbor node i; V di is the reported pheromone value of this route, which indicates the quality of
the best route from node i to node d; Cij is the locally maintained cost value of hopping from node
j to node i.
In order to keep the pheromone obtained from the pheromone diffusion process separate from the
regular pheromone, which is obtained in the reactive route setup process, it is stored as a virtual
pheromone value, denoted as ωdji. This denotes the virtual pheromone of node j to destination d
via neighbor node i. ωdji is assigned the value of K
d
ji.
The additional overhead caused by this step is negligible, because adding the table to the hello
message only increases its size by a few bytes. No additional control packets need to be sent out, so
no additional media access control overhead is introduced either.
3.2.2 Proactive Ant Sampling
In the proactive ant sampling process, source nodes send out proactive forward ants regularly to
gather routing information for ongoing data sessions. In the experiments, during data sessions,
proactive forward ants are sent out every second. Proactive forward ants apply a probability rule
described in equation 3.5 [121, 122] to choose their next hop.
P dij(t) = (max [τdij(t), ωdij(t)] ⋅Rij(t))α∑l∈Ndi (max [τdil(t), ωdil(t)] ⋅Rij(t))α ,∀j ∈ Ndi (3.5)
This rule is similar to the one described in equation 3.1. In the experiments, the α used in
equation 3.5 is set to 2. Once the proactive ant reaches its destination node, it is converted into a
proactive backward ant which has the same behavior of a reactive backward ants. It updates the
regular pheromone values on its way back to its source node.
As consequence, the attractive virtual pheromone values obtained from the pheromone diffusion
process can be investigated by the proactive ants in the proactive ant sampling process and, if the
proactive backward ant comes back, a new route is found for data transmission.
3.3 Data Transmission in SAFEACO
After the setup of the route, data packets are forwarded hop by hop towards their destination node.
Different from DSR protocol in which the route information is included in the packet header, the
routing information is distributively stored in the pheromone tables at each intermediate node.
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Therefore, each hop makes the routing decision for forwarding data packets to the next hop. One
thing worth to be noticed is that only the regular pheromone is considered in the routing decisions.
In SAFEACO, nodes forward data packets stochastically, based on the different regular pheromone
values saved in the pheromone table for the targeting destination node. The probabilistic decision
rules used to chose the next hop for data packets is described in equation 3.6.
P dij(t) = [τdij(t) ⋅Rij(t)]β∑l∈Ndi [τdil(t) ⋅Ril(t)]β ,∀j ∈ N
d
i (3.6)
P dij(t) is the probability of an data packet moving from node i to node j on the way to the
destination node d at the t-th iteration step or time slot; Ndi is the set of current neighboring nodes
of node i, over which a route to node d is known; τdij(t) is the regular pheromone intensity on
the link between nodes i and j on the way to destination node d at t-th iteration step or time slot;
Rij(t) is the reliability value estimated by the fuzzy detection system in section 3.5 for the link
between nodes i and j at the t-th iteration step or time slot; β ⩾ 1, is a parameter which can control
the exploratory behavior of the ants.
This rule is the same as the one used by the reactive forward ants as shown in equation 3.1 in
section 3.1, except the parameter β. In order to adapt the relative preference for the best routes
for data and ants separately, β can be set to a different value as the one used for α in equation 3.1.
Generally speaking, by setting β value low, data packets are forwarded over multiple routes which
can improve the network throughput, but in this case, routes with low pheromone values are also
considered in the data transmission. On the other hand, data packets are concentrated on the best
routes when β value is high. In the experiments, β is set to a relative high value 20, which is used
in AntHocNet [127], as only good routes of more or less equal reliability should be used for the
data transmission.
3.4 Handling of Link Failures in SAFEACO
Due to the movement of one node or the change of radio interference or transmission power, link
failure may occur frequently in MANETs. In SAFEACO, link failure detection is either caused
by the failed unicast transmission of control packet or data packets from lower layer or via the
used of hello messages. The first detection is based on the MAC layer protocol which usually has a
mechanism to inform the upper layer about the success or failure of a unicast transmission. The
second detection is based on the hello messages sent periodically by all the nodes in the network. If
one node does not hear from a certain neighbor node for a given time interval which is set to two
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hello message intervals in the experiments, then this node assumes that the certain neighbor node
disappears.
After detecting the link failure, SAFEACO reacts differently depending on how the link failure was
detected. In case the detection was caused by the failed unicast transmission of control packets
or the missed reception of hell messages in predefined interval, the node which detected this link
failure first updates the entires which affected by this link failure in its pheromone table and then
it broadcasts a link failure notification message. This message notifies the other surrounding nodes
about this route change. After receiving a link failure notification message, nodes update their
pheromone tables according to the information contained in the message. In case that the reported
link failure affects their own routes, these node will further broadcast the link failure message.
If the detection is due to the failed unicast of a data packet, and the node which detected this
link failure does not have an alternative route for this data packet, it will start a local route repair
process to salvage the data packet. Assume node i detected a link failure and it does not have
any alternative route, it buffers the data packet and sends out the repair forward ants which are
identical to the reactive forward ants except that the repair forward ant can be broadcast a limited
number of times. In the experiments, this number is set to 2. Therefore, the local repair process is
similar to the reactive route setup process. Once the repair backward ant arrives the node i, node i
can forward the buffered data packet to the destination node. If no backward ants come back to
node i before the timeout occurs, then node i discards the buffered data packet and broadcasts
a link failure notification message. In case that node i has already broadcasted the link failure
message, but still receives new data packets from its upstream hop, node i will send out an unicast
warning message to this node.
3.5 Malicious Behavior Detection in SAFEACO
Besides the basic routing mechanism, the malicious behavior detection system is presented in
this section. The detection systems used in the MANET and VANET simulations are introduced
respectively in section 3.5.2 and 3.5.3.
3.5.1 Why Use Fuzzy Logic?
In order to protect the network from malicious attacks, a distributed fuzzy logic based misbehavior
detection system is proposed. Due to their inherent mobility in MANETs, usually only very limited
information about the surrounding environment is available. Reasoning with only information
about, e.g., neighboring nodes can be difficult for traditional approaches and provides insufficient
amounts of data to perform online machine learning on nodes [121, 122]. These circumstances
make fuzzy logic an appropriate choice, as fuzzy inference systems can operate with fuzzy data
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as it is usually available in this type of scenario. Benign nodes may drop packets due to channel
congestion, interference or collisions, so assigning them a binary "reliable" flag would not be
appropriate, while the softer categorization provided by a fuzzy logic system allows representing
these nuances well.
3.5.2 Fuzzy Logic Based Detection System in MANETs
The first series of experiments in this work were launched in MANETs scope. For these exper-
iments, the aim is to protect the network from black hole attacks and the Sybil attacks. More
information about these two attacks are given in section 2.4. The detection system presented is
shown in figure 3.4. The forward rate and the recent transmission were given to the detection
system as input values, while the reliability is the output value of the detection system [121, 126].
Input Values
When a node sends a packet to be forwarded by another node, the sending node will keep listening
on the radio channel to check if the receiving node actually forwards the packet within one second.
Only the most recent 30 packets are watched for in this way by sniffing the link. The ratio of
packets forwarded by a node to packets sent to a node corresponds to its forward rate. In the fuzzy
system, this rate can either be "low", "medium" or "high". The membership function for this input
value is given in Figure 3.5a.
The second input for the fuzzy system is the recent transmission, which is defined as the number of
packets sent to a given node for forwarding, no matter if it was actually heard to be forwarded or
not. Only packets from the last 30 seconds are considered here. The limitation of a maximum of
thirty packets in total being considered, as described with regard to the forward rate, also applies.
Figure 3.4: SAFEACO’s fuzzy module in MANET experiments.
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In the fuzzy system, this rate can either be "low", "medium" or "high". The membership function is
given in Figure 3.5b.
Output Value
The fuzzy logic module performs fuzzy inference on the two input values and generates an output
value called reliability. This output value can be either "very unreliable", "unreliable", "neutral",
"reliable" or "very reliable". The membership function is given in figure 3.5c. This output value is
then employed to make decisions regarding the routing process.
Fuzzy Rules
As shown in figure 3.4, the input values are first fuzzified by the fuzzifier in the fuzzy inference
system, then, based on a number of predefined fuzzy rules and the membership functions the
inferencing is performed. The result is defuzzified, which results in the final reliability value used
in SAFEACO.
The rule base used for inference can be described as follows:
If the forward rate is low and the recent transmission is low, the reliability is assumed to be neutral,
as not much is known about the behavior of the node. If the recent transmission is medium or high,
the node is categorized as very unreliable.
If the forward rate is medium, the recent transmission values of low, medium and high each corre-
spond to reliability values of reliable, neutral and unreliable.
Finally, if the forward rate is high and the recent transmission is low, the node is assumed to be
reliable. For recent transmission values of medium and high it is assumed to be very reliable.
3.5.3 Fuzzy Logic Based Detection System in VANETs
The second series of experiments launched in VANETs is the extension of the first experiments
launched in MANETs. These experiments aimed for investigating the performance of SAFEACO
in VANET scenarios and also aimed for evaluating the robustness of SAFEACO under multiple
attacks, for example, under the black hole and the flooding attacks in the same time. Therefore,
some modifications are made to the detection system to detect the flooding attacks [122]. The
following part presents more details.
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(a) Forward rate. (b) Recent transmission.
(c) Incoming rate. (d) Reliability.
Figure 3.5: Membership functions for inputs (3.5a, 3.5b), 3.5c) and output (3.5d).
Figure 3.6: SAFEACO’s fuzzy module in VANET experiments.
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Input Values
Beside the two input values introduced in section 3.5.2, a third input value is added to the fuzzy
detection system in VANET experiments. As shown in figure 3.6, it is the incoming rate, which is
the number of received packets from one single neighbor node within a predefined interval. This
parameter is an indicator that allows us to detect flooding nodes. In the fuzzy system, this rate
can either be "low", "medium" or "high". The membership function is given in figure 3.5c. The
output value of the fuzzy detection system in VANETs is also named "reliability". Its membership
function is the same as introduced in figure 3.5d.
Fuzzy Rules
As shown in figure 3.6, the fuzzy inference system used in VANET experiments is similar to that
used in MANETs experiments except the different fuzzy rule bases. Due to the modification of
the input values, the corresponding fuzzy rules based are changed to the new rules which are
described in table 3.1. In this table, a vector (a, b, c) means, that the forward rate is has value a, the
recent transmission has value b and the incoming rate has value c, which possible values being Low,
Medium and High.
3.5.4 Fuzzy Inference System
SAFEACO enhances AntHocNet with a distributed fuzzy logic based malicious behavior detection
system based on a traffic monitoring system. Since the traffic monitoring system only observers
traffic in the network, the detection system does not cause any additional control packets in
the routing protocol. In MANET experiments, every node monitors each of its neighbor nodes’
behaviors and passes the observed parameters, namely the forward rate and the number of recent
transmissions of packets to be forwarded, into its fuzzy inference system. In VANET experiments,
an additional parameter, incoming rate, is also given to the fuzzy inference system. The fuzzy
inference system estimates the reliability value of the observed neighbor node. This reliability
value represents the quality of the link to this neighbor node and it is used during the route
Reliability Input combinations
Very reliable (H, M, L), (H, H, L), (H, M, M), (H, H, M)
Reliable (M, L, L), (H, L, L), (M, L, M), (H, L, M)
Neutral (L, L, L), (M, M, L), (L, L, M), (M, M, M)
Unreliable (M, H, L), (M, H, M)
Very unreliable In all other cases
© 2018 IEEE
Table 3.1: Applied fuzzy rules
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decision process for both reactive and proactive forward ants, as shown in equation 3.1 and 3.5.
In the experiments, the threshold value of the reliability is set to 0.12. All nodes node whose
reliability value is below the threshold are considered unreliable and will not be chosen by reactive
or proactive forward ants. In the case that a node only has pheromone values for unreliable nodes,
it will send out new reactive forward ants to discover new routes, which may result in additional
overhead.
In MANET experiments, the forward rate and the number of recent transmissions of packets to
be forwarded are chosen to detect black hole attacks and in VANET experiments, an additional
input parameter is added to the fuzzy detection system and the corresponding fuzzy rules are also
modified to detect the flooding attacks. If there is a need to consider other types of network layer
attacks in the routing protocol, slight modifications of the input parameters and the fuzzy rules
can fulfill the requirements. This shows the general flexibility of the fuzzy detection system, which
allows it to be adapted to handle any concrete demands of an application.

68 CHAPTER 3. SAFEACO IN MANETS
Chapter 4
Implementation
In this chapter, the network simulators used in this work and the implementation parameters of
both MANET and VANET scenarios are introduced in detail.
4.1 Network Simulator
In order to investigate the performance of SAFEACO when undergoing flooding, black hole and
Sybil attacks, a network simulator is needed. There exist many network simulators. Basically they
can be categorized into two gropes. The first group is the open source simulators, such as NS-2 [84],
NS-3 [105] and OmNet++ [104]. The other group is the proprietary network simulators, such as
QualNet [55]. Generally speaking, all the mentioned simulators are representative in their own
group and could be applied for the general network simulations. The open source simulators are
free for research and educational use and the proprietary ones are not free, but they usually could
provide an easy to use GUI and visualization tools for data analysis. The scenario requirements
are first considered. As introduced before, this research consists of two series of experiments.
One is in launched in MANET scenarios and the other in VANET scenarios. In the second series,
the set up of the street map, cars’ mobility model, and other car related parameters are very
important. Considering the requirements of the VANET scenarios, it can be seen that the QualNet
simulator provides little support for this, while on the contrary the open source simulators work
well together with the Simulation of Urban Mobility (SUMO) [128] tool, which is commonly used
for setting up the VANET scenarios. Therefore, only the open source simulators which fulfill all
the requirements will be further considered. Among the three open source network simulators,
since NS-3 is the successor of NS-2, the final choice is then between NS-3 and OmNet++. Both of
these two simulators are popular discrete event network simulators nowadays and could work
together with the SUMO tool for VANET scenarios. After implementing small projects in them,
the running time in OmNet++ is found to be a bit longer, thus the proposed protocol is finally
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implemented in the NS-3 simulator and its performance according to various metrics is compared
to that of Enhanced Adaptive ACKnowledgment modified version (EAACKm), which is based
on EAACK [23], but was modified slightly to ease implementation without negatively impacting
performance under the given scenario.
4.2 Implementation in MANETs
In this section, the parameter settings which are used in the base scenario for MANET scenarios
are introduced [121, 126]. The implementation of EAACK is also presented in detail.
4.2.1 Basic Scenario
In the basic scenario, there are 50 nodes in a rectangular area with dimensions of 500 m × 1500 m.
It’s assumed that the area is completely free of obstacles which could affect the nodes’ movement
or radio transmissions. Node mobility is modeled according to a modified RWP with a minimum
speed to mitigate the known issues [73] with this model. The nodes move with a randomly selected
speed between 5 m/s and 20 m/s and the pause time is set to 30 s. Radio transmission is modeled
according to the Friis propagation model [129], with a transmission range of approximately 250 m.
There are 10 Constant Bit Rate (CBR) sessions in the network. Each CBR session starts randomly
between 0 s and 30 s. Each source node of a CBR session sends out 4 data packets per second, with
a size of 64 B each. The total duration of each simulation run is set to 900 s. Table 4.1 summarizes
some of the important parameters in the basic scenario.
Table 4.1: Parameter settings in MANET basic scenario
Parameters Value
Number of nodes 50
CBR sessions 10
Maximum speed 20 m/h
Data send rate 256 bytes/s
Size of network area 500 m x 1500 m
Simulation duration 900 s
4.2.2 Implementation of EAACK
To ensure a fair comparison and ease the implementation in NS-3 [105], some modifications are
made to EAACK. The modified version of EAACK is marked as EAACKm. The main difference is
the use of a blacklist which replaces the use of the MRA messages originally used in EAACK. The
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blacklist is used to record nodes which do not send acknowledgments and isolate them in future
sessions.
EAACK specifies an S-ACK mode. In this mode, for each consecutive sequence of three nodes
in a route, the third node must send an acknowledgment to the first node. If the first node does
not receive this acknowledgment, it reports both the second and third node as malicious. In this
mode, a malicious node can easily make false reports against innocent nodes. The source node
cannot verify these reports, unless it can find another independent route to the destination node
and uses this to verify whether the destination node has received the reportedly missing data
packet. In a highly dynamic network, it is not always guaranteed that multiple independent routes
exist. Even if such routes exist, the delay incurred by such a verification process would be high. In
order to avoid this problem, the implementation of EAACK is slightly different from the original
design. When the first node receives the acknowledgment from the third node, it forwards this
acknowledgment to the source node if it is not itself the source node. The source node records
all received acknowledgments in a list. After a predefined interval, it checks the IDs inside the
acknowledgments in the list and compares them to the route. This way, the source node is able to
determine which nodes did not send an acknowledgment and can blacklist them. Nodes on the
blacklist will not be chosen to be part of any future routes.
The proposed blacklist mechanism avoids sending extra control packets to finish the misbehavior
report authentication process. Furthermore, it reduces the the delay caused by the authentication
process and enables it to detect malicious nodes even in case that there does not exist an alternative
route between the source and destination nodes. In other words, this modification could improve
the detection rate and reduce both overhead and delay. Therefore, this modification in the imple-
mentation does not negatively influence the performance of EAACK and it does not reduce the
security level of EAACK, since no fake misbehavior report attacks exist in the experiments.
Another difference is that the cryptography used in EAACK is not implemented to ease the
implementation. The black hole attack implemented in the experiments only aims to drop data
packets, not modify or record them. To ensure that packet sizes remain the same, padding is added
to packets instead of signatures. Therefore, this difference does not influence the overhead and
security level of EAACK.
4.3 Implementation in VANETs
In this section, the parameter settings which are used in the base scenario for VANET scenarios is
introduced [122].
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Figure 4.1: Traffic map generated in SUMO.
4.3.1 Basic Scenario
The SUMO [128] traffic simulator is applied for simulating the vehicular network scenarios. In the
basic scenario, there are 70 vehicles in a square area with dimensions of 750 m × 750 m. The map
is shown in figure 4.1. Each street is bi-directorial and each direction has two lanes. There are 16
traffic conjunctions altogether and the distance between adjacent traffic conjunctions is 250 m. The
speed limit in each street is 50 m/s. The traffic lights are setup with SUMO default values. Radio
transmission is modeled according to the Friis propagation model [129], with a transmission power
of 20 dBm which approximately covers one ninth of the map’s area. There are 10 CBR sessions in
the network. Each CBR session starts randomly between 0 s and 30 s. Each source node of a CBR
session sends out 4 data packets per second, with a size of 64 B each. The total duration of each
simulation run is set to 1000 s. Table 4.2 summarizes some of the important parameters in the basic
scenario.
Table 4.2: Parameter settings in VANET basic scenario
Parameters Value
Number of vehicles 70
CBR sessions 10
Maximum speed 50 m/h
Data send rate 256 bytes/s
Size of network area 750 m x 750 m
Simulation duration 1000 s
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Chapter 5
Evaluation
In this chapter, the evaluation of SAFEACO’s performance over two series of experiments are
introduced. The simulation results are also compared with other well-known routing protocols.
The intermediate results have been introduced in [121, 122, 126].
5.1 Evaluation Measures
Five different measures have been chosen for the evaluation of the proposed approach:
5.1.1 Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR)
This parameter is calculated by using the total number of packets received by the destination nodes
divided by the total number of packets sent by the source nodes [121, 122]. The PDR’s value is in
the range of [0,1]. Since the purpose of a black hole attack is to disturb the communication in the
network by dropping packets, ensuring a high PDR value is the main goal of the approach. The
formula is given as follows:
PDR = # packets received at destination nodes
# packets sent by source nodes
5.1.2 Overhead in Packets
The average overhead in packets is the total number of transmitted control packets divided by the
number of data packets delivered.It should be noted that sending a forward ant from the source
node to the destination node over n intermediate nodes, is counted as n + 1 transmissions, but
sending a data packet instead, is counted as one packet being delivery. The overheads caused by
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the MAC layer, Internet Protocol version 4 (IPv4) and User Datagram Protocol (UDP) headers are
all included in the calculation.
5.1.3 Overhead in Bytes
The average overhead in bytes is the total number of bytes transmitted in control messages divided
by the total number of bytes in delivered data packets [121, 122]. In wireless communications, the
overhead in the MAC layer is calculated per transmission, therefore, few large transmissions lead
to less total overhead than many small transmissions. As consequence, a high overhead in bytes is
more tolerable than a high overhead in packets.
5.1.4 End-to-end Delay
The end-to-end delay of a packet is the amount of time that passes between its sending time and
its receiving time [121, 122]. For each simulation run, this value is then averaged over all packets
that were actually received in this run. Packets that get dropped during the simulation period are
not considered in this measure, because a dropped packet’s delay would be infinite and make the
measure useless. For brevity, the delay refers to the end-to-end delay from now on, whenever not
explicitly states otherwise.
5.1.5 Robustness
The value of robustness is in the range of [0,1], with low values indicating that the black hole
attack can disturb communication in the network to a high degree, while high values indicate a
more resilient network. In order to calculate this parameter, the following formula is employed:
Robustness = 1 − # dropped packets due to attack
# delivered data packets
The first four measures presented in this section are used to quantify the effectiveness of the
approach in solving the general problem it has been designed to address. Having a high PDR and
a low delay measure with low or reasonable overhead would show that SAFEACO is suitable as a
routing algorithm in general. The last measure quantifies the resistance against malicious attacks
which aims for the packet drop.
5.2. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION IN MANETS 77
5.1.6 Analytic Measures
In order to quantify the fluctuation of the metrics in the experimental results, the maximum
variation VariationMax. and the standard deviation VDev are applied in the following sections. This
first value is the difference between the maximum value VMax. and minimum value VMin. of a
metric, as shown in the following equation:
VariationMax. = VMax. −VMin.
For example, in table 5.3 the maximum PDR of SAFEACO-2BH is in scenarios when the maximum
node speed is 5 m/s and the minimum PDR of SAFEACO-2BH is in scenarios when the maximum
node speed is 30 m/s. Therefore, the maximum variation of of SAFEACO-2BH’s PDR is the
difference between these two PDR values. All other variation values used in this thesis are
calculated in the same way.
The standard deviation VDev is a measure of how widely these metric values are dispersed from
their mean values.
VDev = √∑Ni=1(Vi − Vmean)2
N
(5.1)
where Vi is the value of a metric; Vmean is the average value of that metric; N is the number of
sample values of that metric.
To collect the data, ten runs of the simulation for each scenario with different random seeds are
performed. Therefore, the final results shown in the figures are averaged based on the ten runs.
5.2 Performance Evaluation in MANETs
In order to comprehensively investigate the performance of SAFEACO, various of experiments
based on different scenarios are launched. As introduced in section 2.4, two kinds of attacks
are implemented in this series of experiments and the performance of SAFEACO is evaluated
respectively for each attack. For the black hole attack scenarios, the maximum node speed and the
number of CBR sessions are varied in the experiments. The number of Sybil nodes in the network
and the number of Sybil identities per Sybil node are varied in the Sybil attack scenarios. Table 5.1
gives an overview of the different series of experiments launched in MANET scenarios.
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Table 5.1: MANET experiments
MANET Experiments
Black hole attacks MANET series 1: varying max. node speed from 5 to 30 m/s
MANET series 2: varying no. of CBR sessions from 5 to 10
Sybil attacks MANET series 3: varying no. of Sybil nodes from 1 to 10
MANET series 4: varying no. of Sybil identities from 2 to 9
5.2.1 Performance Under Black Hole Attacks
Under Black Hole Attack, Varying Node Speed
Starting from the basic scenario described in section 4.2.1, the maximum speed of the nodes is
varied between 5 m/s and 30 m/s in 5 m/s steps. Since the aim is to evaluate the performance of
SAFEACO in both normal and sophisticated environments, SAFEACO is simulated in three kinds
of scenarios: without black hole attacks, with one ongoing black hole node and with two ongoing
black hole nodes. AntHocNet and EAACKm are chosen for comparisons in different scenarios.
Since AODV is one of the most representative state-of-the-art routing protocol in MANETs, its
performance of in scenarios without any attacks is also demonstrate here as a baseline in the
evaluation figures. The abbreviations used in the evaluation figures in this section can be found in
table 5.8.
In theory, the topology of the network changes more frequently while the mobility of nodes
increases. In consequence, links would break more often than in a network with low mobility
nodes. Generally speaking, link breakages lead to more overhead, lower PDR and higher delay.
For example, if a link which is involved in an active route breaks, the routing protocol should react
to this change. Normally route error messages are sent out which causes more overhead and the
intermediate nodes may try to find an alternative route to salvage the data packets affected by
Abbreviation Description
AODV-0BH AODV without black hole
AntHocNet-0BH AntHocNet without black hole
AntHocNet-1BH AntHocNet with 1 black hole
AntHocNet-2BH AntHocNet with 2 black holes
EEACKm-0BH EEACKm without black hole
EEACKm-1BH EEACKm with 1 black hole
EEACKm-2BH EEACKm with 2 black holes
SAFEACO-0BH SAFEACO without black hole
SAFEACO-1BH SAFEACO with 1 black hole
SAFEACO-2BH SAFEACO with 2 black holes
Table 5.2: Abbreviations of different MANET configurations
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Figure 5.1: Under black hole attack, varying node speed.
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the link breakage. If the intermediate nodes successfully find a new route, they can forward the
buffered data packets to the destination nodes; otherwise, the buffered packets will be dropped.
This leads to a lower PDR. The salvaged data packets also cause a higher delay, due to the buffer
time at the intermediate nodes.
Figure 5.1a [121] shows the simulation results for the PDR of SAFEACO, AntHocNet and EAACKm
while the maximum node speed is increasing. AODV without attacks is provided as an anchor
value for the performance comparison. Figure 5.1a shows that AntHocNet has the best perfor-
mance of PDR in scenarios without any attacks and SAFEACO outperforms EAACKm and AODV
obviously in this case. However, if there is any black hole nodes in the network, AntHocNet suffers
more than the other two protocols and SAFEACO turns to be the best solution. Although a clear
performance drop which caused by the black hole nodes can be found in all three protocols when
the number of black hole nodes in the network increases, AntHocNet with a average drop of PDR
in 41.8 % suffers the most, while the PDR of EAACKm drops 20.7 % in average. In comparison
to them, SAFEACO with a drop in 7.0 % performs the best. Moreover, when focus on varying
the node speed, the PDR of SAFEACO remains in the same level and above that of all other
approaches under consideration in all scenarios under black hole attacks. On the contrary, the
PDR of EAACKm under black hole attacks decreases while the node maximum speed increases.
Looking at the differences in PDR over varying speeds, it is found that SAFEACO runs have lower
variation in performance than EAACKm runs. Detailed variation data can be found in table 5.3.
Overall, the PDR of SAFEACO is more stable and resilient against attacks than that of EAACKm.
Figure 5.1b and 5.1c [121] present the average overhead in packets and in bytes for all the selected
protocols. A moderate growth in overhead for all protocols can be found in both figures, as
is expected with growing speed. The overhead of SAFEACO both in packets and in bytes is
higher than the one of AntHocNet in two cases. This is because in SAFEACO normal nodes
which drop the data packets due to congestion would be classified as unreliable nodes. Due
to this kind of misclassification, source nodes have to send new FANTs to discover new routes
which leads to sending out more control packets. Therefore, SAFEACO has higher overhead than
AntHocNet. Similar to SAFEACO, in EAACKm source nodes send out their own special control
packets to detect the malicious nodes in the network and therefore it also has higher overhead than
Scenario Maximum variation
SAFEACO-0BH 0.017918
SAFEACO-1BH 0.025846
SAFEACO-2BH 0.030623
EAACKm-0BH 0.147799
EAACKm-1BH 0.086153
EAACKm-2BH 0.060689
Table 5.3: Maximum PDR variation over speeds
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AntHocNet. However, the overhead of EAACKm is almost always in the same level as the one of
SAFEACO and both of them are below the overhead of AODV. Comparing the overhead in normal
scenarios with the one in scenarios under attacks shows that the overhead of SAFEACO increases
when the number of black hole nodes increases. A similar trend can be found with EAACKm, but
it has slight fluctuations. Table 5.4 shows the maximum overhead variation, which is the difference
between maximum and minimum overhead. The maximum overhead variation of EAACKm
both in packets and bytes is higher than the one of SAFEACO. This shows that the overhead of
EAACKm increases more than the one of SAFEACO while the node speed is increasing.
The average end-to-end delay is given in figure 5.1d [121]. An increasing trend can be clearly
recognized in both SAFEACO and EAACKm, as is expected with growing speed. However, the
delay of EAACKm is obviously higher and increases more rapidly than the one of SAFEACO
in all cases. The delay variations of AODV and AntHocNet are −8.4 % and 7.6 % respectively.
Compare to 53.4 %, the one of EAACKm, the delay of AODV and AntHocNet can be considered
to remain in the same level when the node speed increases. Figure 5.1d shows that the ACO-based
routing mechanisms outperform AODV routing approach. Although AntHocNet has the lowest
delay, specially under black hole attacks, this is mainly an artifact of how delay is calculated in the
experiments, where the delay caused by dropped packets is not considered. Figure 5.1a shows that
AntHocNet lost the most data packets under the black hole attacks. When the number of black hole
nodes in the network increases, the delay metric of the protocols decreases. For example, the delay
of EAACKm-2BH is obviously lower than the one of EAACKm-0BH for all node speeds. One
possible reason for this trend is that dropped packets are not considered during the calculation of
delay. Figure 5.1a shows that more packets are dropped due to the black hole attack in AntHocNet-
2BH, SAFEACO-2BH and EAACKm-2BH. Therefore, all protocols perform better with respect
to average delay when they are attacked. Looking at the delay measurements of SAFEACO as
speed goes up, it shows that delay increases slightly with increasing speed. EAACKm’s delay is
consistently much higher than that of SAFEACO in all considered cases.
Scenario Overhead in packets Overhead in bytes
SAFEACO-0BH 1.305850 1.040830
SAFEACO-1BH 1.450000 1.151830
SAFEACO-2BH 1.561700 1.236010
AntHocNet-0BH 0.822840 0.657380
AntHocNet-1BH 0.708780 0.578720
AntHocNet-2BH 0.952170 0.751890
EAACKm-0BH 4.911830 1.954427
EAACKm-1BH 6.298320 2.238928
EAACKm-2BH 4.157792 1.449652
AODV-0BH 0.850100 0.558200
Table 5.4: Maximum overhead variation over speeds
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Figure 5.1e shows clearly that more black hole nodes bring more harmful effects to the network.
However, unlike the AntHocNet and EAACKm, in which the effect of a second black hole node is
obviously more pronounced, the robustness of SAFEACO reduces only slightly with two black hole
nodes. AntHocNet doesn’t have a direct defense mechanism against the black hole attacks, thus it
is reasonable for it to have lower robustness values than SAFEACO. Although the robustness of
EAACKm improves smoothly as node speed increases, the improvement is very limited. When
the node speed is slow, its robustness is not better, in some cases, even worse than the robustness
of AntHocNet. Moreover, the robustness of SAFEACO is not strongly affected by increasing node
speeds. With both one and two black hole nodes, the performance of SAFEACO remains on
a similar level and steadily above that of EAACKm and AntHocNet. From this point of view,
SAFEACO is the best solution for defending the network against black hole attacks.
Under Black Hole Attack, Varying Number Of CBR Sessions
Starting from the basic scenario, the number of CBR sessions in this series of experiments is varied
from 5 to 10. AntHocNet and EAACKm are chosen for comparisons in different scenarios. The
performance of AODV in scenarios without any attacks is also demonstrated here as a baseline in
the evaluation figures. The abbreviations used in the evaluation figures in this section are the same
as shown in table 5.8.
In theory, the density of packets for network communication increases while the number of
CBR sessions increases. In consequence, packet congestions would happen more often than
in a network with low packets density. Packet congestions usually lead to retransmission of
packets which further results in longer end-to-end delay. Moreover, in the worst case a high
frequency of packet congestions could also result in dropping the packets which have exceeded
their maximum retransmission times. Therefore, PDR could be reduced when the number of CBR
sessions increases.
Figure 5.2 [126] shows various performance measures of SAFEACO, AntHocNet, EAACKm and
AODV. When the number of CBR sessions increases, the PDR for all protocols almost remains at
the same level. With the exception of EAACKm, the standard deviations of other lines are all under
0.8 %. The standard deviations of EAACKm in three scenarios are from 0.9 to 2.0 %. Generally
speaking, the increase of CBR sessions leads to a slightly lower PDR as expected. However,
the reduction in PDR is not huge in all considered cases. In scenarios without any black hole
attacks, AntHocNet-0BH has the best PDR performance, but the difference between AntHocNet
and SAFEACO is very small and both of them obviously outperforms the other two protocols.
However, in scenarios with black hole attacks, AntHocNet suffers much more than the other two
protocols and SAFEACO shows the best performance. Furthermore, the PDR decreases when there
are more black hole nodes in the network. Although EAACKm outperforms AntHocNet when
there are two black hole nodes in the network, in scenarios with one black hole node, EAACKm
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(a) Average packet delivery ratio.
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Figure 5.2: Under black hole attack, varying number of CBR sessions.
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performs generally worse than AntHocNet.
As shown in figure 5.2b and 5.2c [126], other than for EAACKm a clear dropping trend for the
two kinds of overhead parameters can be found for all three remaining protocols. Despite AODV
having the highest decrease in overhead, overall it remains the highest. In contrast, AntHocNet
shows the lowest overhead in both cases. This indicates that the ACO routing structure works
more efficiently when there is more communication traffic in the network. The same effect could
also be seen for SAFEACO. However, the variation of overhead in SAFEACO is not as much as
in AntHocNet. Another clear trend is that the two kinds of overhead increase when the number
of black hole nodes increases. Instead of dropping, the overhead of EAACKm both in packets
and in bytes stay almost at the same level. However, there are small fluctuations in both cases
and the effect of the increased number of black hole nodes is not as clear for EAACKm as for the
ACO-based routing protocols.
An increasing trend in the average end-to-end delay can be clearly recognized for SAFEACO,
AODV and EAACKm, when the number of CBR sessions increases. With the rapid increase rate,
the delay of EAACKm is obviously higher than that of SAFEACO and the difference between them
is getting growing. Similar to figure 5.1d, AntHocNet in figure 5.2d [126] has the lowest delay, but
this is mainly because the delay caused by dropped packets is not considered in the calculation.
Figure 5.2a shows that AntHocNet loses the most data packets while under black hole attacks.
As previously seen in figure 5.1e, the robustness of SAFEACO under black hole attack in figure 5.2e
is the best and it obviously outperforms other two protocols. It shows obviously that more
malicious nodes bring more harmful effects to the network. However, the negative effect dose
not reduce the robustness in SAFEACO much, unlike in AntHocNet and EAACKm. Although the
robustness of EAACKm improves smoothly when there are more CBR sessions in the network,
the improvement is limited and with fluctuations which might be caused by the authentication
process designed in the original EAACK protocol.
5.2.2 Performance Under Sybil Attacks
This section presents the performance of SAFEACO under Sybil attacks which are introduced in
section 2.4.2. Sybil attacks in which Sybil nodes only switch their identities do not bring harmful
effect to the routing performance, so a black hole attack is embedded into the Sybil attack. In the
following, Sybil attack refers to Sybil attacks with embedded black hole attacks, whenever not
explicitly states otherwise. In theory this kind of Sybil attack is basically a variant of black hole
attacks. However, it could give malicious nodes more opportunities to attack the network. For
example, if the first identity is detected by the normal nodes, the Sybil node can switch its identity
to another identity which is new in the network and the surrounding nodes will treat this identity
as a new node.
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(a) Average packet delivery ratio.
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Figure 5.3: Under Sybil attack, varying number of Sybil nodes.
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Under Sybil Attack, Varying Number of Sybil Nodes
The base scenario used in this series evolved from the base scenario described in section 4.2.1. All
parameters stay the same except that one node in the network is set to be the Sybil node which has
two identities. The two identities are not shown simultaneously in the network, instead the Sybil
node switches its identities in every 50 seconds and launches the black hole attack with each Sybil
identity.
In order to investigate the performance of SAFEACO under Sybil attacks, the number of Sybil nodes
in the network is increases from 1 to 10 and the results are presented in figure 5.3. Since the detailed
investigation in section 5.2.1 shows that SAFEACO outperform AntHocNet obviously under black
hole attack, in this series of experiments the performance of SAFEACO is only compared with that
of EAACKm.
Figure 5.3a [121] shows that the PDR of both protocols decreases when the number of Sybil nodes
increases. However, the PDR of SAFEACO is obviously higher than that of EAACKm. SAFEACO
could deliver almost 70.0 % of the data packets even when 20.0 % of the network size are malicious,
while EAACKm could only deliver ca. 30.0 % data packets under the same condition. Figure 5.3b
and 5.3c [121] present the average overhead in packets and in bytes respectively. A moderate
increase trend of SAFEACO is shown in both figures. However, the overhead of SAFEACO is still
lower than that of EAACKm in both cases. Figure 5.3d [121] shows that the end to end delay of
both protocols decreases when the number of Sybil nodes in the network increases. This tendency
is probably due to way of the average end to end delay is calculated. As introduced in section 5.1,
the delay caused by the dropped data packets is not considered in the calculation. Figure 5.3a
shows that the percentage of dropped data packets is getting higher while the number of Sybil
nodes is increasing. Figure 5.3e shows that more Sybil nodes bring more harmful effects to the
network. With a drop of 39.2 % in robustness for EAACKm, the negative effect is more pronounced.
However, this effect is smaller in SAFEACO which has a drop of 10.1 % instead. This indicates that
SAFEACO is more robust than EAACKm under Sybil attacks.
Under Sybil Attack, Varying Number of Sybil identities
Starting from the base scenario described in section 4.2.1, all parameters stay the same except
setting one node in the network to be the Sybil node which has multiple identities. These multiple
identities are not shown simultaneously in the network, instead the Sybil node switches its
identities every 50 seconds and launches the black hole attack with each Sybil identity. Different
from the previous experiments, the number of Sybil identities which a Sybil node could have
is increased from 2 to 9. Since the previous series of experiments shows that SAFEACO clearly
outperform EAACKm under Sybil attacks, this series of experiments is designed only to investigate
whether the Sybil attack against SAFEACO could become more effective with more Sybil identities.
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(a) Average packet delivery ratio.
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(b) Average overhead in packets.
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(c) Average overhead in bytes.
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Figure 5.4: Under Sybil attack, varying number of Sybil identities.
88 CHAPTER 5. EVALUATION
The results are presented in figure 5.4.
It’s clear to see that when there are more Sybil nodes in the network, SAFEACO turns out to have
lower PDR, higher overhead, lower delay and robustness and this tendency is clearly valid for all
considered cases, no matter how many identities a Sybil node could have. When fixing the number
of Sybil nodes in the network, the performance of SAFEACO remains at the same level when the
number of Sybil identities increases. The fluctuations in PDR and in the two kinds of overhead
are all under 0.6 % which is negligible. Although the delay of SAFEACO has more fluctuations,
its standard deviation of delay is 2.2 % which is not huge. Another interesting finding is that the
robustness value is getting slightly higher when the number of Sybil identities increases. The
difference becomes easier to recognize when the number of Sybil identities is higher than three. A
possible reason for this is that by switching its Sybil identities a Sybil node has to wait for new
FANT packets to launch a black hole attack. Before receiving a new FANT packet with its new
Sybil identity, the Sybil node can not drop any more packets. The total number of dropped packets
is reduced and as consequence the robustness value is increased. However, the effect seen in the
robustness value is not strictly dependent on the number of Sybil identities which is represented
as small fluctuations in the figure. This might be due to randomness in the experiments and the
growing trend in robustness can be clearly recognized.
Generally speaking, the results indicate that in SAFEACO Sybil nodes can not get more benefit
by just increasing the number of Sybil identities. This is mainly because in SAFEACO each node
estimates the reliability of its neighbor nodes based on their behavior in forwarding packets, not
their identities. As soon as the output value from the fuzzy detection system is under the threshold
value, the Sybil node will be considered as unreliable node, no matter which Sybil identity is
currently in use. Therefore, in SAFEACO nodes can detect Sybil attacks efficiently.
5.2.3 Discussion
In this section, the performance of SAFEACO for MANET scenarios is investigated based on the
different series of experiments. Two kinds of attacks are implemented to evaluate the performance.
AODV, AntHocNet and EAACKm are chosen for the comparisons. Table 5.5 summarizes the
comparison results. Instead of showing the two kinds of overhead separately, only one column
for overhead is shown, since the variation trends of the two overhead metrics are identical. The
results show that SAFEACO has the best PDR and highest robustness, although its overhead and
delay are a little bit higher than AntHocNet. Despite this, SAFEACO is obviously the best solution
when defending against black hole attacks. It’s notable that AntHocNet has the lowest delay when
considering only the received data packets. However, the PDR of AntHocNet is the lowest when
under black hole attacks. In the two black hole nodes scenarios, the PDR of AntHocNet even drops
to almost 50.0 % which makes the delay of AntHocNet less comparable. Moreover, the delay of
SAFEACO is obviously lower than the one of EAACKm. Therefore, the fourth column of table 5.5
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which is noted with (*), shows the second best protocol, SAFEACO, instead of AntHocNet.
Table 5.5: Best performance under black hole attacks
Varied Parameters PDR Overhead Delay(*) Robustness
Max. Node Speed SAFEACO AntHocNet SAFEACO SAFEACO
No. of CBR Sessions SAFEACO AntHocNet SAFEACO SAFEACO
Table 5.6: Performance of SAFEACO under Sybil attacks
Varied Parameters PDR Overhead Delay Robustness
No. of Sybil Nodes decreased increased decreased decreased
No. of Sybil Identities stable stable stable increased
Table 5.6 presents the tendency of SAFEACO’s performance when varying the selected simulation
parameters. It is clear that the performance of SAFEACO based on all evaluation metrics decreases
when the number of Sybil nodes increases. However, when fixing the number of Sybil nodes in the
network, but increasing the number of Sybil identities, the performance of SAFEACO is stable or
even gets slightly better as is the case for robustness. This indicates that the malicious behavior
detection system in SAFEACO works stably and efficiently, no mater how many identities a Sybil
node has.
Overall, the simulation results show that SAFEACO is able to efficiently deliver the packets while
dynamically detecting the malicious nodes in the network. The fuzzy based detection system
robustly evaluates nodes based on limited information and has built-in high fault tolerance. The
results of varying the maximum node speed experiments show that, the PDR performance of
SAFEACO remains almost at the same level as the node speed increases. Specially, in comparison
with other protocols, SAFEACO has the best PDR performance under black hole attacks. Moreover,
SAFEACO also shows clearly better performance and robustness with its higher PDR and lower
delay and overhead than EAACKm in scenarios with Sybil nodes.
In the next section, the performance and scalability of SAFEACO in different VANET scenarios
will be further investigated.
5.3 Performance Evaluation in VANETs
In this section, various experiments are launched to investigate the performance of SAFEACO in
VANET scenarios. As introduced in section 2.4, black hole and flooding attacks are implemented
for this series of experiments and the performance of SAFEACO is evaluated respectively for each
attack. Due to the new attack type, the fuzzy detection system is also modified as introduced in
section 3.5.3. For the black hole attack scenarios, the number of black hole vehicles is varied from
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1 to 5 in the experiments. The number of flooding vehicles in the network is also varied from 1
to 5 in the flooding attack scenarios. Finally, a series of experiments are launched, where black
hole attacks and flooding attacks are simultaneous deployed in the network. Table 5.7 gives an
overview of the different series of experiments launched in VANET scenarios.
Table 5.7: VANET experiments
VANET Experiments
Black hole attacks VANET series 1: varying no. of black hole vehicles from 1 to 5
Flooding attacks VANET series 2: varying no. of flooding vehicles from 1 to 5
Black hole or flooding attacks VANET series 3: varying no. of total vehicles from 70 to 100
Black hole and flooding attacks VANET series 4: varying no. of total vehicles from 70 to 100
5.3.1 Performance Under Black Hole Attacks
Starting from the basic scenario in section 4.3.1, the number of black hole vehicles in the network is
increased from 1 to 5 to investigate the network performance of SAFEACO against the black hole
attack over a range of different sophisticated scenarios. AntHocNet is chosen for comparisons in
different scenarios.
In theory, more data packets will be dropped when there are more black hole vehicles in the
network. Because the density of black hole vehicles is getting higher and the possibility that black
hole vehicles receive the FANT packets is therefore increased. In consequence, PDR will be lower,
while delay and overhead are experted to be higher.
Figure 5.5a shows that the PDR of both SAFEACO and AntHocNet drop as experted. However,
the PDR of SAFEACO which has decreased by 2.4 % is obviously higher than that of AntHocNet
which has decreased by 16.5 %. Specially, in a network with five black hole vehicles the PDR of
SAFEACO still remains at 86.5 % while the PDR of AntHocNet is only 64.4 %. The overall average
difference of PDR between the two protocols is 17.9 %. Despite the good performance in PDR,
SAFEACO has higher overhead than AntHocNet as shown in figure 5.5b and 5.5c. Although the
values are different, the trends in these two figures are identical. The results are similar as those in
the series of MANET experiments. However, the overhead drops moderately in all cases when the
number of black hole vehicles increases. This indicates that the ACO-based routing protocols have
good reliability of overhead in the more sophisticated scenarios. In comparison with SAFEACO,
the overhead of AntHocNet has higher fluctuations, especially when the number of black hole
vehicles is increased from 1 to 2. This may be due to the randomness of the vehicles’ positions. For
example, in a scenario where two black hole vehicles block the source vehicle, the source vehicle
could not find any route without attacks and all its data packets are dropped. After a while the
reliability of these two vehicles is reduced under the threshold value and the source vehicle will not
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Figure 5.5: Under black hole attack, varying number of black hole vehicles.
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consider them for packet transmission. As the source vehicle does not have any other neighbors, it
will not send out further FANT packets to discover new routes. In consequence, the overhead in
this scenario is reduced sharply. Besides the higher overhead, SAFEACO also has higher delay as
shown in figure 5.5d. This trend is also similar to that in the MANET experiments. When there
are more black hole vehicles in the network, the delay reduces moderately for both protocols. The
explanation is the same as in the MANET scenarios. Figure 5.5e indicates that more black hole
vehicles bring more harmful effects to the network. With a 21.2 % reduction of the robustness
for AntHocNet, the negative effect is very pronounced. However, this effect is much smaller in
SAFEACO which drops only by 3.5 %, with an average robustness for SAFEACO of 97.1 %. This
indicates that SAFEACO can discover safe routes and deliver the packets more efficiently under
black hole attacks.
5.3.2 Performance Under Flooding Attacks
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Figure 5.6: Under flooding attack, varying number of flooding vehicles.
Starting from the basic scenario in section 4.3.1, the number of flooding vehicles in the network is
increased from 1 to 5 to investigate the network performance of SAFEACO against the flooding
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attacks over a range of different sophisticated scenarios. AntHocNet is chosen for comparisons in
different scenarios.
In theory, the flooding vehicles can block the wireless channel of their neighboring vehicles and
maliciously induce the normal vehicles to search routes to the non-exist destination vehicles. The
flooding attack aims to consume network resources, such as bandwidth, to exhaust the energy
available to vehicles or their computational power and to disrupt the routing process in the network.
Therefore, lower PDR, higher delay and overhead are expected in this series of experiments. One
thing notable is that the performance metric "robustness" is not evaluated for any flooding attacks
scenarios. If there is no packet drop attack in the network, then the robustness value will stay with
1 making it useless as a measure.
Figure 5.6 shows the results as expected. The PDR of SAFEACO drops moderately while the PDR
of AntHocNet decreases more sharply. In the worst case, the PDR of AntHocNet is only 51.8 %
while SAFEACO still remains at 83.3 %. The negative effect caused by the flooding attack can
be recognized also easily from the delay and the overhead. Figure 5.6b shows that AntHocNet
suffers more significantly from the increased number of flooding vehicles. The lack of a malicious
behavior detection system in AntHocNet leads to a rapid increase of delay. In the worst case, the
delay of AntHocNet is almost four times the delay of SAFEACO. The same trend can be found in
the two kinds of overhead. In the worst case, the overhead of AntHocNet is about five times the
overhead of SAFEACO. All these results indicate that SAFEACO benefits from the fuzzy based
detection system and that it can effectively defend against flooding attacks.
5.3.3 Performance As Vehicle Density Increases
In this section, the performance of SAFEACO in VANETs under both black hole and flooding
attacks is investigated. Instead of running simulations with always 70 vehicles in the network, this
series of experiments is launched in different scenarios which have different amounts of vehicles.
Starting from the basic scenario, all parameters are kept the same, except for the number of vehicles.
It is increased from 70 to 100, in steps of 10. This allows us to investigate network performance
over a range of different vehicle density scenarios. SAFEACO is compared with AntHocNet under
two kinds of attacks. The abbreviations used in the figures can be found in table 5.8.
In theory, the average number of neighbors per vehicle should increase as the vehicle density
gets higher. In consequence, more alternative routes should exist between source and destination
vehicles. In general, alternative routes improve the reliability of routing protocol against link
breakages. For example, if a link which is involved in an active route breaks, the routing protocol
could directly choose an alternative route and continue the data transmission. This increases the
PDR. However, due to the higher vehicle density, there may exist more packet collisions which
could lead to higher delay and overhead.
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(a) Average packet delivery ratio.
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Figure 5.7: Under single type of attacks, varying number of vehicles.
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The simulation results for SAFEACO and AntHocNet in three different scenarios each are shown
in figure 5.7 [122]. It is clear that the PDR increases with the vehicle density in all cases. In the
scenario without any attacks, the PDR of these both protocols is very close. However, if there is
one malicious vehicle in the network, no matter if it is a black hole vehicle or flooding vehicle,
the PDR of SAFEACO-1B and SAFEACO-1F turns out to be noticeably higher. With an average
17.5 % drop in the PDR AntHocNet suffers more when under black hole attacks, while the PDR
of SAFEACO under both black hole and flooding attacks remains almost the same as in the case
without any attacks.
Figure 5.7b and 5.7c [122] present the average overhead in packets and in bytes respectively. Since
the tendency of the two kinds of overhead is the same, overhead in this section refers to the both
kinds of overhead. With growing density a moderate growth of overhead can be found in all
cases from these two figures. The overhead of AntHocNet-1F is obviously the highest one. This is
mainly because of the flooded fake FANT packets and other control packets caused by these fake
FANT packets. The overhead shown in figure 5.6c and 5.6d from the previous experiments also
indicates that the flooding attack leads to higher overhead and delay. Other than AntHocNet-1F,
the overhead of all other cases is stable and the overhead of the three SAFEACO cases is higher
than AntHocNet and AntHocNet-1B. This is due to false positives of the fuzzy detection system.
The system cannot differentiate packets dropped due to black hole attacks and those packets
dropped due to regular channel issues, such as packet collisions. Once a normal vehicle is detected
as a malicious vehicle, it will not be selected in any routes until it has proven that it is benign.
This can cause a new route discovery process, which leads to additional overhead. The average
end-to-end delay is given in figure 5.7d [122]. An increasing trend can be clearly recognized in
both SAFEACO and AntHocNet when the network is attacked. But the increasing tendency of
SAFEACO in delay is much more moderate in comparison to that of AntHocNet-1F. The delay of
AntHocNet-1F is the highest in all cases. This indicates that the delay of AntHocNet suffers the
most under the flooding attack. In normal cases, the delay of both SAFEACO and AntHocNet are
stable. However, the delay value drops very slightly under black hole attack in SAFEACO-1B and
AntHocNet-1B. This is mainly an artifact of how delay is calculated in the experiments, where the
Abbreviation Description Section
SAFEACO SAFEACO without any malicious vehicle section 5.3.3 & 5.3.4
SAFEACO-1B SAFEACO with 1 black hole (BH) vehicle section 5.3.3
SAFEACO-1F SAFEACO with 1 flooding vehicle section 5.3.3
SAFEACO-1B1F SAFEACO with 1 BH & 1 flooding vehicle section 5.3.4
AntHocNet AntHocNet without any malicious vehicle section 5.3.3 & 5.3.4
AntHocNet-1B AntHocNet with 1 BH vehicle section 5.3.3
AntHocNet-1F AntHocNet with 1 flooding vehicle section 5.3.3
AntHocNet-1B1F AntHocNet with 1 BH & 1 flooding vehicle section 5.3.4
Table 5.8: Abbreviations of different VANET configurations
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delay caused by dropped packets is not considered. By looking to the PDR in figure 5.7a [122], it
can be seen that SAFEACO-1B and AntHocNet-1B lost more data packets than the normal cases.
Similar to the results presented in figure 5.1e, the robustness of SAFEACO-1B in figure 5.7e is
obviously higher than the one of AntHocNet-1B. This indicates that SAFEACO can also protect
the network against the black hole attack efficiently in VANET scenarios. Moreover, the robustness
is increasing moderately while the number of vehicles is increasing which shows the reliability of
SAFEACO in dense networks.
Overall, the results show that AntHocNet’s PDR suffers a lot from black hole attacks and its delay
and overhead suffers from flooding attacks. When using the AntHocNet routing protocol, either a
black hole or a flooding vehicle can attack the network routing process very effectively. In contrast,
the performance of SAFEACO is stable under both attacks. It does have higher delay or overhead
in some cases, but its PDR is always better than that of AntHocNet when under attack. PDR, delay
and overhead all increase with growing vehicle density.
5.3.4 Performance Under Multiple Types of Attacks
This series of experiments is an extension of the previous series in section 5.3.3. All parameters
used in this series of experiments are kept the same as the ones used in previous section. The
scenarios with attacks however contain multiple attacks in the network at the same time. There are
always two malicious vehicles: a black hole vehicle and a flooding vehicle. These two malicious
vehicles work independently and do not collude with each other. SAFEACO is compared with
AntHocNet under these concurrent types of attacks. The abbreviations used in the figures can be
found in table 5.8.
Scenarios Reduction
SAFEACO-1B 0.018056
SAFEACO-1F 0.012675
SAFEACO-1B1F 0.020987
AntHocNet-1B 0.180809
AntHocNet-1F 0.037155
AntHocNet-1B1F 0.150485
Table 5.9: Reduction of PDR in different scenarios
The simulation results are presented in figure 5.8 [122]. In scenarios without any malicious vehicle
in the network, the PDR of SAFEACO and of AntHocNet is almost the same and it increases
slightly when the vehicle density increases. However, SAFEACO outperforms AntHocNet in
average by 0.3 % in this series of experiments. Table 5.9 shows the reduction of PDR between
scenarios without any attacks and that with attacks. Comparing the PDR of SAFEACO with
SAFEACO-1B1F, it shows a slight drop of 2.1 %. However, the drop of 15.0 % between AntHocNet
and AntHocNet-1B1F is much more pronounced, showing its lower resilience against black hole
5.3. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION IN VANETS 97
(a) Average packet delivery ratio.
 0
 20
 40
 60
 80
 100
 120
 140
 160
 60  70  80  90  100  110
Ov
er
he
ad
 in
 P
ac
ke
ts
Number of Vehicles
(b) Average overhead in packets. (c) Average overhead in bytes.
(d) Average end-to-end delay.
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 60  70  80  90  100  110
Ro
bu
st
ne
ss
Number of Vehicles
(e) Average robustness.
Figure 5.8: Under multiple types of attacks, varying number of vehicles.
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and flooding attacks. The average overhead in packets and in bytes has the same trend as
shown in figure 5.8b and 5.8c [122]. Therefore, overhead in this section refers to both kinds of
overhead. A moderate growth of overhead can be found in all four cases. Here, the overhead
of AntHocNet-1B1F is obviously higher than that of all other cases. The average end-to-end
delay of AntHocNet-1B1F is the highest delay in figure 5.8d [122] which is similar to the delay
of AntHocNet-1F in figure 5.7d [122]. This is mainly caused by the flooding attack. The delay of
SAFEACO in both cases is higher than that of AntHocNet, with the same reason as mentioned in
section 5.3.3. Similar to the results presented in figure 5.7e, the robustness of SAFEACO-1B1F in
figure 5.8e is higher than the one of AntHocNet-1B1F. This indicates that SAFEACO performs well
under both black hole and flooding attacks in VANET scenarios. Moreover, the increasing trend
of robustness in this series of experiments indicates that the reliability of SAFEACO increases in
dense networks.
Generally, the tendency of all the evaluation metrics in figure 5.7 is the same as the one in figure 5.8.
Looking at the differences in PDR over varying vehicle density, it shows that high densities result
in an increase in PDR. The same trend can be also found in the average end-to-end delay and
the average overhead. However, there are some small differences. For example, the average
delay of AntHocNet-1B1F is lower than that of AntHocNet-1F. This is mainly because the black
hole attack caused a higher number of packets to be dropped and the delay of these dropped
packets is not included in the calculation of the average delay. Moreover, the average overhead
of AntHocNet-1B1F is higher than that of AntHocNet-1F in figure 5.7. This indicates that both
the black hole and flooding attack can lead to higher overhead in AntHocNet. Nevertheless,
the difference between the SAFEACO-1B1F and SAFEACO-1F is very small. This indicates that
SAFEACO is resilient against black hole and flooding attacks and that this resilience still keeps
increasing with increasing vehicle density when the number of malicious nodes in the network
remains the same.
5.3.5 Discussion
In this section, the performance of SAFEACO for VANET scenarios is investigated based on
the various series of experiments. Black hole and flooding attacks are applied to evaluate the
performance of SAFEACO and AntHocNet. Table 5.10 summarizes the tendency of SAFEACO
while increasing the number of malicious nodes in the network. Due to the identical trends, the
third column in the table which is noted with (*) refers to the overhead in packets and the overhead
in bytes. It is clear to see that the performance of SAFEACO gets worse in most of the cases when
the number of malicious nodes increases. Looking at the results of scenarios with black hole attacks,
the PDR of SAFEACO remains above 86.5 % even when there are five black hole nodes in the
network and its overhead and delay also drop moderately when the number of black hole vehicles
increases. This indicates that SAFEACO is resilient against black hole attacks. In contrast to the
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black hole attack scenarios, the overhead and delay increase in scenarios with flooding attacks
when the number of flooding nodes increases. Moreover, the reduction in PDR is also high than
the one in the black hole attack scenarios. This indicates that flooding attack is more harmful to
the network than black hole attacks. However, SAFEACO clearly outperforms AntHocNet under
flooding attacks. Overall, the PDR of SAFEACO is more stable and resilient against black hole
attacks than that of AntHocNet and SAFEACO outperforms AntHocNet in PDR, overhead and
delay when under flooding attacks.
Table 5.10: Trends of SAFEACO’s performance under single attacks
Type of Attacks PDR Overhead(*) Delay Robustness
Black Hole slightly reduced reduced reduced slightly reduced
Flooding moderately reduced increased increased not evaluated
Table 5.11: Better performance under increasing vehicle density
Attack Types PDR Overhead(*) Delay Robustness
Black Hole (BH) SAFEACO AntHocNet AntHocNet SAFEACO
Flooding SAFEACO SAFEACO SAFEACO not evaluated
BH and Flooding SAFEACO SAFEACO SAFEACO SAFEACO
Table 5.11 summarizes the comparison results when varying vehicle density. Overhead as pre-
sented in this table again refers to both the overhead in packets and in bytes, since the trends of
these metrics are identical. As explained in section 5.3.2, the robustness metric is not evaluated
for scenarios with only flooding attacks. The comparisons show that SAFEACO outperforms
AntHocNet in most of the cases under attacks. In scenarios with the black hole attacks, An-
tHocNet drops more data packets and therefore has a lower delay. However, AntHocNet still
outperforms SAFEACO in overhead. It can be seen as a trade-off between overhead and security.
Despite its higher overhead in scenarios with black hole attacks, SAFEACO is the better solution
in sophisticated networks.
Overall, the simulation results show that SAFEACO can efficiently deliver the packets while
dynamically detecting different types of malicious nodes in VANETs. The increased PDR in
scenarios where the vehicle density increases also indicates that SAFEACO can adapt well to
dense networks which are close to the urban scenarios in the daily life. Moreover, SAFEACO has
obviously less overhead and delay than AntHocNet in scenarios with the flooding attacks. This is
the result of the adapted fuzzy based detection system introduced in section 3.5.3. Besides black
hole attacks, the detection system is also effective at recognizing flooding nodes in VANETs. The
success of the adapted fuzzy based detection system also shows its general flexibility, which allows
it to be adapted to handle any concrete demands of an application.

Chapter 6
Conclusion
In this chapter, the conclusion of this thesis will be presented and the possible research directions
for the future work will also be discussed.
6.1 Summary
In this thesis SAFEACO [121, 122, 126] is proposed, which is a security aware fuzzy logic enhanced
ant colony optimization based routing protocol for MANETs. SAFEACO is a hybrid routing
approach which is inspired by the AntHocNet routing mechanism and it applies a distributed
fuzzy logic detection system to exclude abnormal or malicious nodes from the routing process.
SAFEACO applies the ACO algorithm to discover the optimal routes for efficient packet delivery.
Meanwhile, the fuzzy logic based detection system dynamically updates the reliability ratings of
nodes. This detection system robustly evaluates nodes based on limited network traffic information
in the neighborhood collected by the nodes and has built-in high fault tolerance which can reduce
misclassifications. For example, a normal node which has dropped a data packet due to packet
collision will not be directly judged as malicious, because the detection system performs the
evaluation based on the general behavior of nodes in a predefined period, not only on the dropping
of a single packet. Moreover, the fuzzy reliability value will be updated dynamically, so normal
nodes which are misclassified as malicious nodes still have a chance to prove themselves reliable
by stably forwarding data packets.
The performance of SAFEACO is investigated in both MANET and VANET scenarios. Various
experiments are launched as shown in table 5.1 and 5.7 from chapter 5 and three well-known
network attacks introduced in section 2.4 are implemented to test the resilience of SAFEACO
in sophisticated environments. The simulation results of the various experiments show that,
SAFEACO scales well in different MANET and VANET scenarios and that it enables efficient
routing by providing high PDR and low or comparable end-to-end delay and overhead.
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Besides the efficient routing performance, SAFEACO also shows its resilience in defending against
different types of network layer attacks. The robustness metric shows its high robustness against
black hole, Sybil and flooding attacks. In addition, section 3.5.3 gives a good example for adapting
the fuzzy logic based detection system to different scenarios. The experimental results show that
SAFEACO can detect not only a single attack, such as black hole and flooding attacks, but it also
can detect multiple attacks which are launched in the same time by different malicious nodes which
do not collude with each other. Moreover, the corresponding modification in the detection system
can be performed in two steps. Therefore, the SAFEACO routing protocol can be adapted further
to provide higher efficiency and security in MANETs routing, according to different circumstances.
6.2 Future work
As the proposed SAFEACO is a initial research work in this area, the limitations and challenges in
this work lead to further studies. In this section, a few of ideas, which are out of the scope of this
thesis, but can be considered as the outset for future work, will be discussed briefly.
QoS Metrics
From the evaluation results, SAFEACO has shown its high efficiency in the routing process.
However, until now it does not consider any QoS related routing metrics. In order to further
improve the routing efficiency, some of the QoS metrics should be considered in the decision
making for route selections. For example, adapting the equation 3.3 in section 3.1 to consider the
remaining battery of a node and the bandwidth when estimating the cost for transferring packets.
This extension does not change either the routing structure or the detection system and therefore
can be easily adapted to SAFEACO.
Improving Security
Further improving the security level which SAFEACO can guarantee is a meaningful but challeng-
ing task. Regarding the security challenges in MANETs it would also be interesting to investigate
the performance of SAFEACO under other types of attacks. In theory, the fuzzy logic based detec-
tion system should be able to defend against new types of attacks by performing the following
two steps: First of all, metrics which are related to the targeted type of attacks should be identified
and be added as new input values into the detection system. In the next step, the fuzzy rules used
in the detection system need to be adapted according to these new input values. One such case is
described in section 3.5.3. However, when the number of input values increases, it becomes more
difficult to define the fuzzy rules, because fuzzy rules are usually made based on experience or
opinions of experts and they may need to be adapted several times according to the application
scenarios. Finding the proper way to select the input values for the detection system which will
allow it to detect as many ongoing attacks as possible is an interesting future research direction of
this work.
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VANET Scenarios
Since VANET applications developed very fast in the recent years, there is a high demand for
routing protocols which can provide secure and efficient communication in VANETs. Although
SAFEACO has been investigated in some VANET scenarios and has shown good performance,
these scenarios are based on an abstract map as shown in figure 4.1 in section 4.3.1. The streets
in this map are parallel with each other and the distance between arbitrary adjacent traffic con-
junctions is the same. However, this map is not very close to real urban environments in a city.
Therefore, it is worthwhile to investigate the performance of SAFEACO in VANET scenarios with
a real map. Another interesting series of research experiments is to compare the performance
of SAFEACO in different VANET scenarios which have different area sizes with real maps. The
results can indicate whether SAFEACO is resilient when the network size is varying. Further-
more, SAFEACO should be compared with other VANET routing protocols, such as the UMB [31]
protocol.
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